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School Choice Policy and Title VI:
Maximizing Equal Access for K-12
Students in a Substantially
Deregulated Educational
Environment
by
STUART BMGEL*
From the days of the earliest democracies, an inherent tension
has existed between the authority of elected representatives and the
personal autonomy of individuals.'
An examination of the literature in this area reveals that scholars,
jurists, and political leaders have wrestled extensively with the param-
eters of choice in a free society.2 It is, therefore, not surprising that
Americans today are consistently outspoken when debating the na-
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Special Counsel, California State Department of Education. Coordinator of Interdiscipli-
nary UCLA Programs and Course Offerings in Law, Education & Information Studies.
Director of Teacher Education, University of California, Los Angeles (1993-95). The au-
thor would like to express his appreciation to Joel Handler, Allan Keown, Eugene Volokh,
and Amy Stuart Wells for their valuable insights throughout the course of this project. In
addition, the author would like to thank his master's and doctoral students at the UCLA
Graduate School of Education & Information Studies and his law students at the UCLA
School of Law. Their optimism and their commitment to positive change continue to make
all these academic endeavors worthwhile.
1. See e.g., Amy Gutmann, The Disharmony of Democracy, in DEMOCRATIC COM-
MuN=rY 145-152 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993) (attempting to reconcile the
tension between "autonomy and its political conditions"); see also JANE J. MANSBRrDGE,
BEYOND ADvERsARY DEMOCRACY (1980) (documenting efforts to harmonize the compet-
ing interests of individuals at the community level). See generally Frank Michelman, Law's
Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) (discussing the tension between republicanism and
individual rights).
2. See, ag., Guido Calabresi, Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability
(What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARv. L. REv. 80 (1991) (providing a wide
ranging analysis of approaches to judicial review and their impact on fundamental rights in
a participatory democracy); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights
Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MiCH. L. REv. 1077, 1081-101 (1991)
(documenting the mixed results of political and legislative efforts to provide all citizens
with basic choices at the ballot box).
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ture and extent of the right to choose, particularly when focusing on
such paradigmatic emotional issues as abortion, 3 health care,4 and
public education.5
The school choice controversy has dominated educational policy
debates in the 1990s. 6 Bolstered by a groundswell of public support
throughout the nation,7 parental choice in education is seen by many
as the proverbial "idea whose time has come." 8 The question now is
Professor Robert A. Dahl argues that personal choice is one of three main criteria for
deciding whether democratic authority is better than nondemocratic authority. "The prob-
lem," he explains,
is to reconcile personal choice with my nature as a social being ... for if I insist
upon the Criterion of Personal Choice, how can I hope to live peacefully with
others? If the only decisions I am willing to accept and to abide by must be made
by me in order to ensure that they conform to my personal choice, can any proce-
dure for making decisions ever be legitimate? If so, what would such a procedure
be? These are the questions with which Rousseau begins The Social Contract,
which may serve to remind us that the answer is unlikely to be as simple as many
who invoke his name seem to think.
ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? AUTHORIY IN A GOOD SOCIETY 6 (1990);
compare ALAN W. WATTS, THE WAY OF ZEN (1957) ("The perfect way, Tao[,] ... avoids
picking and choosing ....").
3. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection,
and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1242-62 (1992) (discussing women's
reproductive freedom in the context of rights and responsibilities).
4. Recent efforts by President Clinton to reform the nation's health care system trig-
gered a wide-ranging debate on the extent of a person's right to choose a physician. See
generally Adam Clymer et al., The Health Care Debate: What Went Wrong? How the
Health Care Campaign Collapsed-A Special Report, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1994, at Al.
Other issues related to choice in the health care context focus on the right to choose
questionable treatments and the right to choose death. See generally Roger B. Dworkin,
Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND. L.J. 727 (1993).
5. See generally JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY
CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL (1978).
6. See, e.g., JONATHAN KozOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS 61-63 (1991); James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259 (1991)
(arguing for enhanced parental voice in and democratic control of public schools); Amy
Stuart Wells. Choice in Education: Examining the Evidence on Equity, 93 TCHRS. C. REC.
137 (1991).
School choice has recently been called "the most important public policy issue since
the Voting Rights Act." Bret Schundler, The Simple Logic of School Choice, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 1993, at A27.
7. See PETER W. COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF
AMERICA (1994); see also Nanette Asimov, Poll Finds Support for Voucher Idea but
Californians Want Scholastic Safeguards, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 1, 1993, at A23; Susan Chira,
Furor over 'Choice', N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1992, at B10; Millicent Lawton, Gallup Poll
Finds Wide Support for Tuition Vouchers, EDUC. WK., Sept. 23, 1992, at 1.
8. Proponents proclaim that "the school-choice train has left the station ... and it's
not stopping for anything," and even objective observers concede that "in the broad sense"
school-choice is "[not] really a questionable concept anymore." Ernest L. Boyer, the
highly respected president of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching,
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not whether school choice should be implemented, but what type of
choice program would best serve the needs of America's young
people. 9
Choice plans that have emerged in this era tend to fall into one of
three categories: public school choice, private school "voucher" pro-
posals, and charter school legislation.
Public school choice has been an integral feature of larger urban
districts for a long time. Originally linked to desegregation orders, the
first choice plans included "magnet schools" and optional busing pro-
grams for minority students.' 0 Current programs are even more wide-
ranging, often allowing parents a large variety of open enrollment op-
tions-both within their district and across district lines." Support
for public school choice has grown significantly, with policy makers
and reformers at the highest levels endorsing the concept and promot-
ing its efficacy.12
recently declared that today "[ilt's almost impossible to say 'no' to choice in the abstract
It's almost un-American." Lynn Olson, Choice for the Long Haul, EDUC. WK., Nov.
17, 1993, at 27. See generally A Matter of Choice: The Debate Over Schools and the Mar-
ketplace, EDUC. WK. SPECIAL REPORT, Dec. 16, 1992, at Si; Symposium, Educational
Choice, 21 J.L. & EDUC. 501 (1992).
9. See MARK G. YuDoF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND Tm LAW 415-437 (3d
ed. 1992); see also Mark Gladstone, School Choice Initiative Boosts Other Reform Plans,
L.A. TIMES, June 1, 1993, at Al; Chris Pipho, The Vouchers Are Coming!, PH DELTA
KAPPAN, Oct. 1991.
10. See generally AMY STUART WELLS, TIME TO CHOOSE: ArMRICA AT THE CROSS-
ROADS OF SCHOOL CHoiCE POLICY 62-95 (1993).
11. See id. at 96-121. See also Josh Barbanel, Board of Education Votes a School-
Choice Program, N.Y. TIMns, Jan. 14, 1993, at B3 (documenting the creation of one of the
largest school choice programs in the country by the New York City Board of Education);
David L. Kirp, There Is Plenty of Choice Beyond School Vouchers, L.A. TIMS, Oct. 31,
1993, at M6 (describing public school choice as "the quiet education revolution of our
times").
By the end of 1993, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures, eleven
states had "'comprehensive' public-school choice plans, either within or between districts,
that affect[ed] every school system in the state. Eight more [had] limited programs." Re-
searchers of an earlier report, released by the Council of the Great City Schools in 1992,
found that "29 percent of all big-city school districts [already had] some kind of choice
program in every school and that an additional 44 percent [had] a choice program for at
least some schools." Olson, supra note 8, at 28.
12. President Clinton's education reform program (The "Goals 2000: Educate
America Act"), for example, encourages states receiving assistance under the Act to use
some of the funds to promote "public magnet schools, public charter schools, and other
mechanisms for increasing choice among public schools." 20 U.S.C. § 5888 (1988 & Supp.
1995). See 20 U.S.C. § 5801-6144 (1988 & Supp. 1995); see also William Celis, III, New
Education Legislation Defines Federal Role in Nation's Classrooms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
1994, at B1O.
In Michigan, Governor Engler recently proposed giving $4,500 vouchers to students to
use at any public school in the state. See Olson, supra note 8, at 28.
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Private school choice proposals typically allow parents to send
their children to any school, whether public or private, using publicly
funded vouchers. 13 Although only a handful of small experimental
voucher programs currently exist in this country, 14 the concept contin-
ues to gather momentum. 15 This highly controversial form of choice is
mentioned prominently by national leaders as a vehicle for reforming
In 1993, the California Legislature passed two new public school choice bills: AB
1114, which allows parents to enroll their children in any school within their own district if
space is available, and AB 19, which enables families to apply for transfers to schools
outside their district if the receiving district agrees. At the local level, the high-profile
reform plan set forth by the Los Angeles Educational Alliance for Restructuring Schools
Now (LEARN) and adopted by the Los Angeles Unified School District specifically em-
braces public school choice. See LEARN, FOR ALL OUR CHILDREN: A COMMUNITY GEN-
ERATED VISION (1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter COMMUNrry-GENERATED
VISION].
13. Private school choice proposals sometimes include plans for a state-run choice
office, which would channel federal, state, and local funds into the chosen schools. See
JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 215-
226 (1990). Other proposed programs would issue "vouchers" directly to families. These
vouchers could then be redeemed at any local school site. See generally Dennis D. Riley,
Should Market Forces Control Educational Decision Making?, 84 AMER. POLIT. Sci. REV.
549 (1990).
14. See generally Amy Stuart Wells & Stuart Biegel, Public Funds for Private Schools:
Political and First Amendment Considerations, 101 AMER. J. EDUC. 209-11, 218-20, 228
(1993) (documenting the early 1970s voucher demonstration project in San Jose, Califor-
nia, and the recent experiment in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in which a maximum of one thou-
sand low-income children were given state aid to attend private, nonsectarian schools).
By late 1992, several hundred children from low-income families were the benefi-
ciaries of small local voucher programs funded by businesses, private foundations, and in-
dividuals. Most of these programs were inspired by the CHOICE Charitable Trust in
Indianapolis, Indiana. See Private Vouchers Help Many Flee Public Schools, TCHR. MAG.,
Nov.-Dec. 1992.
In late November 1994, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court struck down a school voucher
program that had been in effect since September 1993. Asociacion de Maestros de Puerto
Rico v. Torres, 63 U.S.L.W. 2471 (P.R. Feb. 7, 1995). The court determined that the
voucher program violated article II, section 5 of the Commonwealth Constitution, which
mandates a "system of free and wholly non-sectarian public education" and prohibits the
use of public funds or property for "the support of schools or educational institutions other
than those of the state." Id. at 2471-72. The voucher program had provided families with
an income of less than $18,000 a year with $1,500 credits that could be used by each school-
age child at either the public or private school of their choice. See generally Puerto Rican
Court Voids Private School Vouchers, ST. Louis POsT-DIsPATCH, Dec. 5, 1994, at 2B.
15. Most commentators agree that the voucher concept continues to gather momen-
tum. In 1993, Professor Michael Kirst declared that the school voucher issue "has been
growing in its momentum, not dying." Dan Morain, Voucher Concept Has Come a Long
Way, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1993, at A3. Professor Stephen Carter has warned that the
school voucher controversy "promises to be a contentious political issue for years to
come." STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 194 (1993).
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state educational systems, 16 with voucher proponents now targeting
key "battleground" states. In California, for example, plans are being
made to place a new statewide choice initiative on the 1996 ballot,17
and proponents are determined to avoid the mistakes that led to the
defeat of a similar measure in 1993.18 In New Jersey, Governor Chris-
tine Todd Whitman and Jersey City Mayor Bret Schundler have spo-
ken out eagerly and often in favor of voucher programs for private
schools.19 And in Ohio, Governor George V. Voinovich recently ap-
proved a state budget which provides funding for a pilot voucher pro-
gram in the Cleveland area beginning with the 1996-1997 school
year.20
16. During the 1994 mid-term election campaign, school vouchers were mentioned
prominently in conjunction with the Republic Party's "Contract with America." See, e.g.,
Michael Ross, GOP's Ten-Point Plan, L.A. TnAms, Nov. 23, 1994, at A5. See generally The
Big One, Ti ECONOMISr, November 12, 1994, at 15.
By mid-1995, the Christian Coalition had made public its own blueprint for social
issues legislation-the "Contract with the American Family"-which included a proposal
to establish a federal school voucher demonstration program. House Speaker Newt Ging-
rich attended the coalition's press conference announcing this legislative agenda, and
pledged a floor vote on each item of the new "contract," which had been modeled after his
own "Contract with America." See Mark Pitsch, Conservatives' Social-Issue Agenda
Targets Schools, Eouc. WK., May 24, 1995, at 16; Mark Walsh, Prospects Improve for
Voucher Proposals in Congress, EDuc. Wx., April 5, 1995, at 25.
17. See Scott Wmokur, Another Try for School Vouchers, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 18,
1994, at A17 ("The school-voucher movement is back, led by a rainbow coalition of blacks,
whites, Asians, Christians, and Jews .... [C]ompeting reform proposals include [a] free-
market approach, conceived by former Prop. 174 volunteers with the help of conservative
economist Milton Freedman, and a more moderate proposal involving more money and
more regulation, conceived by Boalt Hall law professor Jack Coons.").
18. See id.; Mi Young Pae, New Drive for School Vouchers: Proponents Hope to Qual-
ify Stronger Version for 1996 Ballot, S.F. CHnON., Sept. 14, 1994, at A19.
In 1993, California voters defeated a ballot initiative that sought to establish statewide
private school choice. See Dan Morain & Sandy Banks, State Voters Reject School Vouch-
ers, L.A. Tams, Nov. 3, 1993, at Al. Colorado voters defeated a similar measure in 1992.
See Mark Walsh, Colorado Defeats Voucher Plan, Backs Limits on Taxes, EDUC. WK., Nov.
11, 1992, at 18.
However, public opinion polls in California show that many voters who opposed their
state's parental choice initiative in fact favored the idea of school vouchers but found the
1993 Proposition to be carelessly worded and poorly thought out. See Asimov, supra note
7, at A23; see also Lynn Olson, Pro-Voucher Forces Waging Uphill Battle in California,
Etuc. WK., Oct. 20, 1993, at 1 ("Several of those ... who are opposed to [California]
Proposition 174 said they could envision the passage of a better-drafted proposal in the
future.").
19. See Ron Scherer, Mayor Schundler Has a List to Buck Democratic Past, CRuS-
TIAN SCIENCE MoNrOR, June 7, 1995, at 3. See generally Kimberly J. McLarin, School
Revolution Rages Under Miss Liberty's Eye, N.Y. TMrns, Oct. 16, 1994, at 42.
20. See Voinovich Signs 7vo-Year Budget Plan, THE PLAIN DEALER, July 1, 1995, at
IA. Under the plan, between 1,000 and 2,500 public school students would be awarded
vouchers of up to $2,500 which could be used to attend private sectarian schools. See
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Charter school programs have emerged as legislative responses to
the widely publicized parental choice debates.21 A growing number of
states have embraced the charter school model, which enables a cer-
tain number of schools to operate outside the dictates of state statutes
and regulations.2 2 Legislation in this area encourages local decision-
making, and educators are typically given a substantial degree of free-
dom to establish goals and devise implementation strategies.2 3
School choice proposals trigger a variety of important legal in-
quiries.2 4 Commentators express ongoing concerns about the use of
generally, Drew Lindsay, Wisconsin, Ohio Back Vouchers for Religious Schools, EDUC.
WK., July 12, 1995, at 1.
Other states that bear watching in this regard include Texas and Wisconsin. In Texas,
newly elected Governor George W. Bush has been an outspoken advocate of private
school choice. See, e.g., Terrence Stutz, School Reform in the Wind; Bush Win May Bring
Most Change in Years, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Nov. 14, 1994, at Al. In Wisconsin, the
legislature recently approved a major expansion of Milwaukee's five-year-old voucher pro-
gram. See Roger Worthington, Milwaukee's Pioneering 'Choice' Voucher Program Nears
Expansion, Cr. TRiB., July 16, 1995, at 3. Under the new legislation, the number of stu-
dents who would be eligible to participate was increased from 1,500 to 15,000. In addition,
the program was expanded to include private religious schools for the first time. See gener-
ally Lindsay, supra; Kimberly J. McLarin, In Test of School Voucher Idea, the Sky's Not
Falling but Neither is Manna, N.Y. TIMEs, April 19, 1995, at B10.
21. See, e.g., Lynn Olson, With Choice Initiative as a Backdrop, 'Charter Schools' Pro-
posed in California, EDUC. WK., Feb. 26, 1992, at 19.
22. Charter school proponents often point to legislation in such states as California,
Massachusetts, and Minnesota. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 47600-16 (West 1993 & Supp.
1995); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 71, § 89 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT.
§ 120.064 (1994). See generally Amanda Datnow et. al., Charter Schools: Teacher Profes-
sionalism and Decentralization, Presentation at the 1994 AERA Annual Meeting, New
Orleans, Louisiana (containing a detailed comparison of charter school statutes in eight
different states) (on file with the author).
Minnesota is generally recognized as the state that "invented" the charter school con-
cept. See, e.g., William Raspberry, To Get Teacher on Their Toes, WASH. POsT, May 19,
1993, at A19. In Mid-1993, the state raised the "cap" on the number of charter schools
allowed. See generally May Jane Smetanka, Critics Decry Adding More Charter Schools,
STAR TRIB., May 9, 1993, at lB. See also Wells, supra note 10, at 121-26.
By 1995, charter schools had been established in 12 states, and at least 20 others were
considering charter school legislation. See Mark Walsh, Twelve States Join Move to Pass
Charter Laws, EDUC. WK., May 10, 1995, at 1.
23. See generally Ruth E. Randall, What Follows School Choice: Teachers As Entre-
preneurs and Charter Schools, Presentation to the American Association of School Ad-
ministrators, San Diego, California (Feb. 21-24, 1992).
Charter school legislation sometimes includes specific accountability provisions. See
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47601(f) (West 1993); MINN. STAT. § 120.064 (1994).
24. See generally Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A Constitutional Analysis,
28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 423 (1995) (focusing on challenges that might be brought in
a school choice context under both the first and fourteenth amendments).
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public funds to support private sectarian education,2 while educators
and policy makers are beginning to pinpoint central issues of equal
access.
26
Both public and private school choice plans attempt to replicate
the free market model in an educational setting by opening schools to
all students who wish to attend.27 As envisioned by school choice pro-
ponents, families would no longer be restricted to the public schools in
their designated districts,2- but may choose from a wide range of
schools in a large geographical area.29 During the admissions process,
decisions regarding the possible use of standardized tests would gener-
ally be left to the individual educational institutions.30 In addition,
voucher plans and charter school legislation often encourage entre-
preneurs to create unique educational environments that cater to spe-
cial groups such as the academically gifted, the athletically gifted, and
the musically gifted. 31 Others speak of expanded opportunities for
government-funded religious training under a parental choice
program.3 2
25. See, e.g., Carlos Alcala, Church-State Questions Cloud Initiative, SACRAMENTO
BEE, June 13, 1993, at B1. See also James B. Egle, Comment, The Constitutional Implica-
tions of School Choice, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 459, 472-87 (analyzing Establishment Clause
considerations); David Futterman, Note, School Choice and the Religion Clauses: The Law
and Politics of Public Aid to Private Parochial Schools, 81 GEO. L.J. 711, 733-39 (1993)
(arguing that voucher plans ultimately violate the free exercise of religion).
26. See Lee Mitgang, School Choice, Carnegie, and Alum Rock, EDUC. WK., Feb. 24,
1993, at 29; What About the Children Left Behind?, N.Y. Trmms, Oct. 27, 1992, at A22 (Op-
Ed) [hereinafter The Children Left Behind]; see also JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D.
SUGARMAN, SCHOLARSmI's FOR CHILDREN (1992) (raising the question of what might be
done to assist the poor in a school choice context). See generally Wells & Biegel, supra note
14, at 227-29.
27. See generally MYRON LIEBERMAN, PRIVATIZATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE
(1989).
28. See, e.g., Paul E. Peterson, Monopoly and Competition in American Education, in
1 CHOICE AND CoNTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (WILLIAM H. CLUNE & JOHN F.
WIrr EDS., 1990). See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85-108
(1962).
29. See Amy Stuart Wells, Consumer Choice in Public Education; A Special Reporg
Quest for Improving Schools Finds Role for Free Market, N.Y. TIMms, Mar. 14, 1990, at Al.
See generally Egle, supra note 25, at 464-65 (describing the roots of the school choice
movement).
30. In a deregulated educational environment, schools would be expected to make
their own admissions decisions, subject to basic boilerplate prohibitions against discrimina-
tion. These decisions might very well be based on standardized admissions tests. See infra
notes 158-166 and accompanying text.
31. See e.g., CHUBB & MOE, supra note 13, at 221-22.
32. See Judith Bolton-Fasman, Private Schools Eying School Choice Bills, THE FOR-
WARD, July 23, 1993, at 4.
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In such a deregulated environment, two significant barriers are
likely to impede the equal access rights of students: transportation
requirements and restrictive admissions practices. 33 This Article seeks
to establish a federal baseline in this regard by identifying and explor-
ing the most likely avenues of prospective litigation under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Part I outlines the basic equity protec-
tions of Title VI, tracing the development and application of the dis-
parate impact model in an education context.34 Parts II and III apply
this model to school choice policy and pinpoint key areas in which
current blueprints and agendas might be vulnerable. Part II focuses
on the transportation hurdle, analyzing potential arguments that
plaintiffs could set forth to increase equal access for students no mat-
ter where their families live.35 Part III turns to the parameters of stu-
dent rights at the admissions stage, focusing on strategies for
enhancing equity in the volatile area of standardized testing.36 The
Article concludes by setting forth a framework for a series of protec-
tive measures that would not only insulate school choice programs
from major civil rights litigation but would also help maximize equal
educational opportunity.37
1. The Title VI 'Discriminatory Effects' Framework and the
Right to Equal Educational Opportunity
The equal opportunity guarantee in education was officially rec-
ognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education.38
Ruling unanimously that segregated public schools violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court em-
33. A third significant barrier to equal access in school choice is the prospective re-
quirement that families contribute additional out-of-pocket funds to help subsidize a "bet-
ter" education. While public school choice programs do not generally require parents to
expend additional financial resources, deregulated public charter schools might ask parents
to help finance a variety of enrichment programs and activities.
It is in the school voucher context, however, that this barrier is most likely to result in
major denials of equal educational opportunity. Consistent with free market principles,
many private school choice proposals would allow schools to establish their own tuition
requirements. While some schools might decide to accept a voucher as full payment for
tuition, other institutions could charge any additional fees that the market would bear. In
the generic plan set forth by Chubb and Moe, for example, "[s]chools may set their own
'tuitions' by determining the minimum scholarship they are willing to accept." CHUBB &
MOE, supra note 13, at 222.
34. See infra notes 38-115 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 116-157 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 158-206 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 207-214 and accompanying text.
38. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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ployed language that extended far beyond the facts of the Brown case
itself. "[I]t is doubtful," Chief Justice Warren wrote, that any child in
America could "reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is de-
nied the opportunity of an education. '39 Such an opportunity, the
Court concluded, "is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms."'4°
Although the Brown decision triggered a volatile debate regard-
ing the definition of "equal educational opportunity" and the extent
to which a legal system could require or enforce such a right,41 the
existence of the right itself is no longer in dispute. Indeed, twenty
years after Brown, Professor Mark Yudof declared that "[a]s an ab-
stract principle, equal educational opportunity occupies a position in
the pantheon of widely shared values equal to monopoly regulation,
monogamy, and peace."42
A. Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence in the Post-Brown Era
While the courts wrestled with appropriate school desegregation
remedies in the 1960s and the 1970s,43 aggressive plaintiffs seeking to
maximize educational opportunities began to challenge a variety of
public school practices under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection guarantees. Litigants soon won major vic-
tories in the areas of school financing,44 district-wide tracking,45 and
39. 1d. at 493.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. See e.g., David K. Cohen, Defining Racial Equality in Education, 16 UCLA L.
REv. 255 (1969); see also James Coleman, The Concept of Equality of Opportunity, 38
HARv. EDuc. REv. 7, 22 (1968) (describing the "change in the concept of equality of edu-
cational opportunity from school resource inputs to effects of schooling").
The debate regarding the scope of the Brown decision and the parameters of the right
to equal educational opportunity continues today. See e.g., Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the
Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALELU. 1285 (1992); Charles R. Lawrence, III, IfHe Hollers
Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKELJ. 431, 438-49, 462-66
(1990); Mark 'Tbshnet, The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. Rv.
173 (1994). See generally MicKEY KAus, THE END OF EQUALrIy (1992).
42. Mark G. Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEx. L. REv.
411, 412 (1973).
43. See eg., Alexander M. Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and
Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. Rev. 193 (1964); Owen M. Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Case-Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 697 (1971).
See generally Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983) (discussing
the manner in which judicial remedies embody the tension between the ideal and the real).
44. See e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977) (finding California's public
school finance system to be violative of the equal protection provisions of the California
Constitution).
45. See e.g., Lemon v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971) (per
curium) (holding that school district that operated as unitary system for only one semester
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equal access for the disabled. 46 By 1976, however, the U.S. Supreme
Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez47 and
Washington v. Davis48 cast doubt on the continuing viability of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a vehicle for the protection of individual
rights in the public school setting.
The Rodriguez Court considered whether education qualified as a
fundamental right and whether wealth merited suspect classification
under the Equal Protection Clause.49 Relying on a Fourteenth
Amendment framework for school finance litigation set forth by legal
activists,50 plaintiffs in a variety of states succeeded in providing the
courts with a vehicle for determining that state school finance formu-
las based primarily on local property taxes were unconstitutional. In
these cases, lower court jurists typically predicated their holdings on
an initial recognition that education was a fundamental right and
wealth was a suspect classification.5' By a 5-4 vote, however, the Rod-
riguez Court rejected both arguments. Unwilling to add education to
the controversial list of implied "fundamental rights" and unwilling to
extend the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to persons with
incomes at or below the poverty level, the Court concluded that the
proper forum for the resolution of these questions was the state
legislature.5 2
Three years later, the Davis Court addressed the elements of dis-
crimination under the Equal Protection Clause.53 Until 1976, it was
unclear whether plaintiffs in certain cases were able to trigger strict
could not assign students to schools within district on basis of test achievement scores); see
also Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 442-92, 511-14 (D.D.C. 1967) (Judge J. Skelly
Wright's classic tracking decision, finding the rigid tracking system in the D.C. public
schools to be violative of both the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fifth
Amendment).
46. See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that
schools are required by statute to provide specialized education for children with special
needs); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257
(E.D. Pa. 1971) (a second landmark decision recognizing the rights of the disabled in a
school setting).
47. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
48. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
49. 411 U.S. at 17-39. Under Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the infringement
of a fundamental right or discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity triggers strict
scrutiny and almost always results in a plaintiff victory. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK ET
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3 (4th ed. 1991).
50. See John E. Coons et al., Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional
Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L. REv. 305 (1969).
51. See generally YUDOF ET AL., supra note 9, at 591-672.
52. 411 U.S. at 58-59.
53. 426 U.S. at 238-48.
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scrutiny on the basis of racial or ethnic discrimination by demonstrat-
ing a discriminatory impact alone.54 The Davis Court held that plain-
tiffs seeking more than rational basis review in cases of discrimination
must prove discriminatory purpose and-cannot prevail simply by show-
ing discriminatory effects.55 Justice White emphasized that facially
neutral state action will trigger strict scrutiny under the suspect classi-
fication category of Fourteenth Amendment review only if it is dis-
criminatory in both impact and purpose.5 6
The Davis doctrine of discriminatory. purpose was particularly
troubling for activists in this area. With most of the inequities in pub-
lic school programs occurring as a result of facially neutral practices
that could not be linked to any overt discriminatory intent, commenta-
tors generally concluded that Davis significantly limited the ability of
education plaintiffs to prevail under the traditional Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection framework.5 7
54. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 1502-03 (2d ed.
1988).
55. 426 U.S. at 239-41.
56. Id. at 242. Cf. Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind but Now I See". White Race Con-
sciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MicH. L. REv. 953 (1993) (crit-
icizing the discriminatory intent requirement).
57. See, e.g., Donald N. Bersoff, Regarding Psychologists Testily: Legal Regulation of
Psychological Assessment in the Public Schools, 39 MD. L. REv. 27, 74-77 (1979); David L.
Kirp, Law, Politics, and Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Judicial Involve-
ment, 47 HAnv. EDUC. REv. 17, 136-37 (1977). But see Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal
Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEx. L. Rlv. 777,
835-37 (1985).
During this era, litigants often abandoned the federal courts completely. It must be
noted, however, that even after Rodriguez and Davis, education plaintiffs continued to win
significant victories in this area under federal constitutional law. And the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1982 decision in the Fourteenth Amendment case of Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982), may provide students alleging a denial of equal opportunity with a viable frame-
work for challenging the policies and practices of school districts today, particularly when
Plyler is read together with the "covertly heightened scrutiny" cases of the same era. See
Stuart Biegel, Reassessing the Applicability of Fundamental Rights Analysis: The Four-
teenth Amendment and the Shaping of Educational Policy After Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub-
lic Schools, 74 CoNmurt. L. REv. 1078, 1086-99 (1989) (documenting the emergence of a
new heightened scrutiny in education under Plyler and other Fourteenth Amendment
cases); see also Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under
the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U.
L. REv. 550, 567-73 (1992) (discussing the levels of scrutiny applied in education cases);
Dennis J. Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection, 1982 Sup. Cr. REv. 167. For a
discussion of the Court's "covertly heightened scrutiny" approach, see TRIBE, supra note
54, at 1443-45.
The Plyler Court determined that a Texas law prohibiting undocumented children
from attending public schools infringed upon the important interests of a discrete class.
The Court's analysis began by identifying a key interest in education along with an impli-
cated class. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, first alluded to the occasionally sus-
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During this same time period however, litigants seeking to maxi-
mize equal opportunity discovered that certain education cases could
be successfully litigated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
without proof of discriminatory intent.
B. The Title VI 'Disparate Impact' Model
Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or
national origin in any program or activity receiving federal funds.58
Although the contours of a Title VI cause of action in an education
setting remained unclear for quite some time,59 courts hearing Title VI
cases began borrowing from the analogous and highly developed juris-
pect nature of an alienage classification and identified a parallel between the class of
students in this case and illegitimate children of previous cases. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-20.
Justice Brennan then cited a wide variety of school-related cases in support of his assertion
that public education was not "merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from
other forms of social welfare legislation, but an important interest that plays a fundamental
role in maintaining the fabric of our society." Id. at 221.
The opinion continued by referencing the right to equal educational opportunity and
concluding that such dire consequences would result from a denial of that right that this
deprivation should trigger heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Id at
221-24. Unlike many fundamental rights cases, in which the interest at stake is found to be
fundamental and the level of scrutiny is therefore deemed to be "strict," the interest in
Plyler was labeled "important" and linked to a process that plays a "fundamental" role. ld
at 221. This important interest, bolstered by the equal access guarantees and the identifica-
tion of a disabling status, thus triggers a level of scrutiny that falls somewhere between the
rational relationship standard and strict judicial review. But see San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) (applying rational basis review).
Although a relatively conservative Court appeared unwilling to extend Plyler in
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450,459 (1988), litigants seeking redress for
the denial of equal access in education-related disputes may find the federal courts much
more receptive today. An increasing sensitivity to equal educational opportunity concerns
has been fueled by the growing recognition that America's schools must play a central role
in narrowing the dangerous gulf between "haves" and "have-nots." See generally Michael
W. Kirst & Allan Odden, National Initiatives and State Education Policy, 4 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 99, 104-09 (1993) (providing an overview of school finance policy issues trig-
gered by recent reform efforts).
In California, for example, a conservative state supreme court recently embraced the
right to equal educational opportunity and employed aggressive language that reminded
many court observers of decisions written by former Chief Justice Rose Bird in the late
1970s. See Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992). See generally Claire Cooper,
Rights, Remedies and Retreats, CAL. LAW., Mar. 1993, at 31.
58. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in pertinent part: "No person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
59. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), was the first major education case to be de-
cided under Title VI. In Lau, Chinese-speaking students argued that the San Francisco
Unified School District's failure to provide equal educational opportunities for children
who did not speak English was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 564.
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prudence of Title VII. 60 Indeed, when Title VI and Title VII were
Judge Hufstedler, dissenting from the denial of a hearing en banc by the Ninth Circuit
in Lau, outlined the arguments of the plaintiffs that led to the filing of this lawsuit:
The majority opinion correctly identifies the two groups of children who
brought this action: (1) 1,790 Chinese school children who speak no English and
are taught none, and (2) 1,066 Chinese children who speak no English and who
receive some kind of remedial instruction in English. The majority's characteriza-
tion of the relief sought as "bilingual education" is misleading. The children do
not seek to have their classes taught in both English and Chinese. All they ask is
that they receive instruction in the English language.
Access to education offered by the public schools is completely foreclosed to
these children who cannot comprehend any of it. They are functionally deaf and
mute.
These Chinese children are not separated from their English-speaking class-
mates by state-erected walls of brick and mortar (Cf. Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion (1954) 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873), but the language barrier,
which the state helps to maintain, insulates the children from their classmates as
effectively as any physical bulwarks. Indeed, these children are more isolated
from equal educational opportunity than were those physically segregated blacks
in Brown; these children cannot communicate at all with their classmates or their
teachers.
Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1973) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the children but declined to consider the equal
protection argument, relying solely on Title VI and its implementing regulations. Writing
for the majority, Justice Douglas quoted extensively from the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare regulations:
Discrimination is barred which has that effect even though no purposeful de-
sign is present: a recipient "may not... utilize criteria or methods of administra-
tion which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination" or have
"the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objec-
tives of the program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national
origin."
Lau, 414 U.S. at 568 (alteration in original) (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (b)(2) (1993).
Despite the central role of Title VI in the Lau case and in the new OCR guidelines
that followed, the applicability of the statute in an education context remained highly un-
settled throughout the 1970s. Although the Lau Court recognized that a violation of Title
VI could be established solely on the basis of discriminatory effect, with no requirement of
discriminatory intent, five members of the U.S. Supreme Court in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) held that the standard for a Title VI viola-
tion should be the same as the standard for an equal protection violation set forth in
Washington v. Davis. See id. at 287 (majority opinion of Powell, J.); ida t 328 (opinion of
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Four of these Justices suggested that the "effects only" test relied upon in Lau was no
longer applicable. See i. at 350-53. See generally Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
463 U.S. 582, 589-94 (1983) (discussing Lau and Bakke).
60. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment .... or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
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enacted as part of the same historic act, legislators and jurists identi-
fied an inextricable link between the two provisions. As Justice Ste-
vens explained, "[b]oth Title VI and Title VII express Congress' belief
that, in the long struggle to eliminate social prejudice and the effects
of prejudice, the principle of individual equality, without regard to
race or religion, was one on which there could be a 'meeting of the
minds.'61
Unlike Equal Protection plaintiffs, Title VII plaintiffs are gener-
ally able to prevail by proving either discriminatory purpose or dis-
criminatory effects. In a series of major cases, the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized the viability of a "disparate impact" cause of action
and identified the requirements for such a lawsuit. The disparate im-
pact model was first recognized by the Court in the Title VII case of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.62 African-American plaintiffs filed an em-
ployment discrimination lawsuit against the power company in Griggs,
arguing that the rejection of black applicants because (1) they did not
have high school diplomas and (2) they performed poorly on two
"professionally prepared" tests, amounted to a violation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.63 After concluding that the company's standards
were not related to job performance, the Court addressed the ques-
tion of whether proof of disparate impact alone could be sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination:
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation .... [A]bsence
of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures
or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for mi-
nority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.64
Under Griggs and its progeny, plaintiffs have the initial burden of
proving that a particular practice has adversely affected the opportu-
nities of a protected class.65 This burden is typically met through the
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
61. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 416 n.19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Commentators exploring Title VI issues also look to Title VII for assistance. See, e.g,
Note, Teaching Inequality: The Problem of Public School Tracking, 102 HARV. L. REv.
1318, 1334-40 (1989) (focusing on Title VI challenges to tracking systems and explaining
the parallels between the jurisprudence of Title VI and Title VII).
62. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
63. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
64. Id. at 431-32.
65. At this point in time, plaintiffs alleging violations of Title VII may choose to pro-
ceed under either a disparate treatment theory or a disparate impact theory. It has been
pointed out that "disparate treatment cases generally occur when a single plaintiff chal-
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demonstration of a statistically significant adverse impact. 66 If a prima
facie showing of discriminatory effects is set forth in this ifmanner, the
defendants must demonstrate a legitimate and bona fide justification
for the challenged conduct.67 Even if such a justification is estab-
lished, however, plaintiffs may still prevail by revealing the existence
of less discriminatory alternatives.68
In Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission,69 five U.S.
Supreme Court Justices found that plaintiffs could bring a disparate
impact cause of action under Title VI and its administrative regula-
tions by employing the framework developed under Title VII. 70
Guardians focused on a challenge by African-American and Latino
police officers to several written examinations administered by the
city and used to make entry-level appointments to the police depart-
ment. These appointments were made in an order which corre-
sponded directly with test scores (those with highest scores being
hired first and those with lower scores being hired last). Additionally,
when the Department laid off police officers in 1975, layoff decisions
were made on a "last-hired, first-fired" basis.71 In Guardians, plain-
tiffs demonstrated that African-American and Latino police officers
had been disproportionately affected by the layoffs.
The threshold issue before the Court was whether plaintiffs
needed to prove discriminatory intent to establish-a violation of Title
VI and its implementing regulations. 72 In announcing the judgment of
the Court, Justice White delivered an opinion analyzing the Court's
internal disagreements regarding the scope of Title VI protection and
determined that "even if Title VI [does] not proscribe unintentional
lenges a particular practice that is detrimental to him or her personally... while disparate
impact may be more [appropriate] in cases involving a number of persons who are affected
by a particular employment practice .... ." KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER,
AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 628 (2d ed. 1985).
66. See e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-50 (1982). See generally David
Copus, The Numbers Game Is the Only Game in Town, 20 How. L.J. 374 (1977) (describ-
ing the use of statistical proof in Title VII cases).
67. See e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Griggs,
401 U.S. at 432.
68. See, eg., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). See generally
Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Less Discriminatory Alternatives in Disparate Im-
pact Litigation, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1621 (1993) [hereinafter Less Discriminatory
Alternatives].
69. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
70. ItL at 584 n.2.
71. Thus, officers who had achieved the lowest scores on the examinations were laid
off first. Id. at 585.
72. Id. at 584.
July 1995]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
racial discrimination, it nevertheless [permits] federal agencies to pro-
mulgate valid regulations with such an effect. '73 Indeed, he pointed
out, "[t]he Title... has been consistently administered in this manner
for almost two decades without interference by Congress. '74 Justice
White concluded that disparate impact lawsuits could in fact be
brought within the context of Title VI, but that they must be brought
only to enforce applicable regulations prohibiting discriminatory
effects.
The language of Title VI on its face is ambiguous; the word 'discrim-
ination' is inherently so. It is surely subject to the construction
given the antidiscrimination proscription of Title VII in [Griggs]...
at least to the extent of permitting, if not requiring, regulations that
reach disparate-impact discrimination.75
The Title VII disparate impact model has thus come to be treated
as "the federal common law definition of discrimination.176 Not only
has Title VII jurisprudence been deemed applicable in Title VI dis-
putes, but also in construing the parameters of Title VIII (The Fair
Housing Act),77 Title IX (prohibiting gender discrimination),78 and
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability).79 These statutes have been interpreted
in a parallel fashion, with decisions construing the application of one
73. Id. at 591-92.
74. Id. at 592-93.
75. Id. at 592.
76. See Paul K. Sonn, Note, Fighting Minority Underrepresentation in Publicly Funded
Construction Projects After Croson: A Title VI Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE L.J. 1577,
1596 (1992).
77. See, e.g., NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 1988), affd,
488 U.S. 15 (1988) ("[T]he disparate impact approach of Title VII cases is fully applicable
to this Title VIII case brought against a public defendant.").
78. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566 (1984); Sharif v. N.Y. State
Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345, 360-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Applying the Title VII formula-
tions to this Title IX case ... this court finds that plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood
of success on the merits.").
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides: "No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
79. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America,
477 U.S. 597, 600 n.4 (1986) (describing the relationship between Section 504 and Title VI).
Section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against dis-
abled persons. As amended in subsequent years, it is now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 and
provides, in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined
in section 706(8) ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ....
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statute often applied by courts considering the implications of
another.8 0
In the 1989 case of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,81 the U.S.
Supreme Court clearly and emphatically limited the protections that
had been established for victims of employment discrimination by
eighteen years of case law under the Griggs Title VII framework. In
determining that plaintiffs had not made out a prima facie case of
"disparate impact" against two Alaskan salmon canneries, 82 the Court
also took what some justices called "major strides backwards" by,
among other things, altering the "longstanding distribution of burdens
of proof in Title VII disparate-impact cases" and requiring "practice-
by-practice statistical proof of causation. '8 3
TWo years later, Congress expressly restored and codified the ba-
sic foundational principles of Title VII disparate impact jurisprudence
by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991.84 The Act specifically ad-
dresses the allocation of burdens, providing that "where an employee
has demonstrated that a particular employment practice causes a dis-
parate impact, both the burden of production and the burden of per-
suasion shift to the employer to show that the practice is job related
and consistent with business necessity."8 5 In addition, the Act permits
a plaintiff "to challenge an employer's 'decisionmaking process' as
(b) For the purposes of this section, the term 'program or activity' means all of
the operations of... (2)(3) a local educational agency,... system of vocational
education, or other school system.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
See also The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §9 12101-12213
(Supp. V 1993), which provides additional protection for disabled persons in both the pub-
lic and private sectors. For a good general overview of this recent act and its implications,
see Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the
Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 1341,1397-1405 (1993) (discussing the legislative background and provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)).
80. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-95 n.16 (1979) (noting the
"kinship" between Title VI and Title IX).
81. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
82. Id. at 646, 650-55.
83. Id. at 661-62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also id. at 656-61 (analyzing causation
and burden of proof).
84. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-16).
Compare Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis
of the Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NoTRE DAME L. RBv. 923, 928
(1993) (noting that "[t]he 1991 Act specifically excludes Wards Cove from its coverage,"
but considering "the eight areas within the 1991 Act in which Congress reversed various
Supreme Court decisions dealing with employment discrimination").
85. Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.4 (7th Cir.
1992). Cf 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
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one employment practice causing a disparate impact. '8 6 These modi-
fications significantly altered the holding that the Court had an-
nounced in Wards Cove.
C. Recent Title VI Education Cases
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not heard a Title VI edu-
cation case since 1978,87 three recent federal appellate decisions ap-
plying the Title VII disparate impact model provide future litigants
with a viable framework for maximizing equal educational opportu-
nity under Title VI.
In Larry P. v. Riles,88 the Ninth Circuit considered whether IQ
tests could be used to place students in special education classes. The
plaintiffs introduced evidence documenting the San Francisco Unified
School District's employment of IQ tests to place a disproportionate
number of African-American students in "educable mentally retarded
classes."'8 9 After many years of litigation, the court concluded that IQ
tests were indeed culturally biased, and that the district's practices vio-
lated Title VI.90
After verifying that the district was receiving federal funds and
that an applicable Title VI regulation promulgated by the Office of
Civil Rights indeed applied,91 the court found that plaintiffs had estab-
lished a prima facie case by clearly demonstrating "the discriminatory
impact of the challenged tests."92 Because the defendant failed to
demonstrate that the requirement which caused this disproportionate
86. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 10 F.3d 1485, 1491 (9th Cir. 1993). See also 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. III 1991).
87. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
88. 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984).
89. See id. at 972-77. Note that "educable mentally retarded" will be abbreviated
E.M.R. hereinafter.
90. See id. at 982-83. The court also found that the district's practices were violative
of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id at 981.
91. The regulation cited by the court, 34 C.F.R. 100.3(b)(2) (originally adopted as 45
C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2)), required that recipients of federal funds not:
utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting
individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or
have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the
objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or
national origin.
Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d at 981 (emphasis added).
92. "It is undisputed," the court found, "that black children as a whole scored ten
points lower than white children on the tests, and that the percentage of black children in
E.M.R. classes was much higher than for whites." Id. at 983.
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impact was justified by educational necessity, the plaintiffs were able
to prevail.93
In NAACP v. Georgia,94 the Eleventh Circuit determined
whether certain ability grouping practices and special education place-
ments in the Georgia public schools violated Title VI.95 After refer-
encing pertinent school desegregation efforts from an historical
perspective, plaintiffs contended that the disproportionate number of
minority students in the "lower" ability groups and in E.M.R. classes
constituted a disparate impact under relevant Title VI regulations.96
Although the plaintiffs in NAACP v. Georgia were ultimately un-
successful, 97 the court's analysis of ability grouping in this case is par-
ticularly instructive. The challenged practices consisted primarily of
"achievement grouping" in the elementary grades for reading and
math only.98 Grouping decisions were predicated on a variety of fac-
tors, including subject-specific standardized tests and teacher evalua-
tions.99 Movement between groups occurred regularly, based on
93. Defendant set forth three arguments in response to plaintiffs' attempt to establish
a prima facie case, all of which were rejected by the court: (1) that E.M.R. classes were "a
benefit for, rather than adverse discrimination against, black children;" (2) that even if the
impact was adverse, it was "not caused by discriminatory criteria (the IQ tests), but by
other nondiscriminatory factors"; and (3) that the "disproportionate number of black chil-
dren in E.M.R. classes is based on a higher incidence of mental retardation in blacks than
in whites that is due to poor nutrition and poor medical care brought on by the lower
socioeconomic status of blacks." Id. at 983.
94. 775 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1985).
95. Id. at 1407-08. The court also considered whether defendant's practices violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973. See id. at 1412-16, 1427-29.
96. Cf. id. at 1421.
97. In analyzing the ability grouping component, the circuit court did not find clear
error in the defendant's educational necessity arguments and disagreed with the plaintiff's
contentions that equally effective less discriminatory alternative practices were available.
Id. at 1417-22. The court determined that the plaintiffs evidence relating to special educa-
tion payments was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, finding that
the criticized practices affect white students to the same degree as black students. Id. at
1421-22. "Practices which detrimentally effect all groups equally do not have a discrimina-
tory effect." Id. at 1422.
98. Id. at 1409-11. One district also established homogeneous ability grouping for
social studies (on the basis of reading evaluations) and science (on the basis of math evalu-
ations). Id. at 1409. Another district set up a "special developmental kindergarten" for
"educationally disadvantaged students," based on the DIAL preschool readiness examina-
tion. Id at 1409-10.
99. Id. at 1416-17 & n.19. Defendants argued unsuccessfully that Guardians should be
limited to cases involving employment discrimination. See id. at n.19 ("Nothing in Guardi-
ans or Choale suggests that the court's interpretation of the regulations implementing Title
VI is limited to employment cases.").
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continuous progress rating systems and formalized, periodic reevalua-
tions of achievement. 100
After recognizing the precedential value of the Guardians deci-
sion in an education context and outlining the elements of a disparate
impact claim,101 Judge Henderson referenced the district court's con-
clusion that plaintiffs "had met their burden of establishing a prima
facie case through statistics showing that the racial composition of
many of the local defendants' regular classrooms differs from what
would be expected from a random distribution.' 0 2 The court then
proceeded to analyze defendant's educational necessity arguments
and found no clear error in the district court's characterization of
achievement grouping as "an 'accepted pedagogical practice,"' noting
that "the educational need[s]" of these students "are being addressed
by the local defendants' practices.' 0 3 Concluding by rejecting plain-
tiffs' contention that "random assignment accompanied by intraclass
grouping" was "an equally sound educational alternative that resulted
in less racial disproportionality," the court ruled in favor of the
defendant. 04
In the recent case of Elston v. Talladega County Board of Educa-
tion,105 the Eleventh Circuit considered the applicability of Title VI
discriminatory effects regulations in a dispute involving the location of
construction sites for new school buildings within a district that had
previously been granted unitary status. 10 6 Because the case was
brought to trial after both Wards Cove'0 7 and the Civil Rights Act of
100. Id. at 1416-17.
101. Id. at 1416-17. "The elements of a disparate impact claim," Judge Henderson
explained:
may be gleaned by reference to cases decided under Title VII ... The plaintiff
first must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a facially neutral practice
has a racially disproportionate effect, whereupon the burden shifts to the defend-
ant to prove a substantial legitimate justification for its practice. The plaintiff then
may ultimately prevail by proffering an equally effective alternative practice
which results in less racial disproportionality or proof that the legitimate practices
are a pretext for discrimination.
Id. at 1417 (citation omitted).
102. Id. at 1417. The court contended that it "need not reach the issue whether the
district court properly found that the plaintiffs made out an adequate prima facie showing
of disparate impact" because it "agree[d] with the lower court's other two conclusions"
regarding educational necessity and equally effective alternative practices. Id
103. Id. at 1418 (quoting the trial court record).
104. Id. at 1420-21.
105. 997 F.2d 1394 (11th Cir. 1993).
106. See id. at 1400-04, 1406-07.
107. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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1991,108 a central threshold question was whether the Title VII dispa-
rate impact model was still applicable in an education context.10 9
Both parties, however, implicitly agreed that the framework outlined
in NAACP v. Georgia was still viable, and the court proceeded to ap-
ply the same disparate impact principles discussed above." 0
A major advantage for litigants in all Title VI education cases is
the ability to prevail without having to prove discriminatory pur-
pose.' Although many would argue that this area of law remains
unsettled,112 it is clear in the mid-1990s that Title VI plaintiffs can es-
tablish a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating the dis-
criminatory effects of school district practices and programs.1 3 Thus
injured students who would not prevail under traditional Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence may still be able to win significant victories
in federal courts"14 if they can demonstrate a disparate impact within
108. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
109. Because neither Wards Cove nor the Civil Rights Act of 1991 had addressed this
question, it was arguably unclear whether and to what extent changes in Title VII jurispru-
dence applied in a Title VI context.
110. See 997 F.2d at 1406-07. The court stated:
[S]ince the Board did not object to the district court's choice of legal standards,
we assume arguendo that the actions challenged by plaintiffs fell within the scope
of those Department of Education Title VI regulations that incorporate a dispa-
rate impact standard, and thus ... that it was proper to apply the disparate impact
analysis in this case.
Id
111. By contrast, litigants alleging discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity under
the Fourteenth Amendment must demonstrate a discriminatory purpose. See supra notes
53-57 and accompanying text.
112. Sonn, supra note 76, at 1581 (suggesting that "Guardians" bifurcated holding that
Title VI requires a showing of discriminatory intent, while still allowing federal agencies to
incorporate "effects-based definitions of discrimination into their regulations implementing
the statute" might not, because of its non-majority status and court personnel changes,
survive the next court examination of Title VI).
113. See id, at 1597-98. See generally supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
114. Although an analysis of state constitutional law and its applicability is beyond the
scope of this Article, it must be noted that in addition to the principles of federal law
outlined in this part, state equal protection guarantees and state education articles can
provide school choice plaintiffs with some interesting and novel approaches to litigation
based on a denial of the right to equal educational opportunity.
For many litigants, state constitutional provisions have become increasingly important
in recent years. See Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalisn: Both Liberal and Conservative,
63 Tax. L. REv. 1081, 1081 (1985) (noting that "state constitutionalism has something to
offer both liberals and conservatives"). Under these provisions, states can provide greater
protection for individual rights than the federal government has provided. The protections
provided by Congress and the federal courts typically constitute a baseline. State legisla-
tures and state courts may not fall below this baseline, but they can, and often do, go much
further. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 -ARv. L. REv. 489, 495 (1977) (noting that "of late, however, more
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and more state courts are construing state constitutional counterparts of provisions of the
Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even more protection than the federal
provisions, even those identically phrased."). In addition, state courts typically feel more
comfortable with broad interpretations of state constitutional provisions because these
documents, unlike the federal constitution, are relatively easy to amend. Many states actu-
ally allow their constitutions to be amended by ballot initiative. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial
Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1509 n.22 (1990).
In recent decades, education plaintiffs have won major victories challenging the ineq-
uitable allocation of resources under state constitutional law. See generally William E.
Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Pub-
lic School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REv. 1639, 1670, 1661-78 (1989) (noting
"three distinct categories" of analysis of state constitutional equality guaranty provisions
and the state cases that fit into them, with categorization depending on how analogous
federal law is treated). While most of these school finance lawsuits have been brought
under state equal protection guarantees, others have focused on the state education
articles.
Noteworthy school finance lawsuits brought under state equal protection guarantees
include Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Hor-
ton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); and Washakie County Sch. Dist. Number One v.
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
Lawsuits relying on state education articles include: Rose v. Council for Better Educ.,
Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615
N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. Number One v. State, 769 P.2d 684
(Mont. 1989); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
Some litigants have been successful by relying on both the equal protection provisions
and the education clauses. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), cert denied,
414 U.S. 976 (1973); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
State constitutions contain a variety of equal protection guarantees ranging from ex-
plicit equal protection clauses to provisions that attempt to guarantee equality in certain
specific instances. See Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional
Law, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1195, 1196-97 (1985). When asked to interpret these provisions,
some state courts follow federal constitutional jurisprudence without deviation. Id. at
1219-20. Other courts employ the federal equal protection framework but reserve the right
to make their own decisions as to what constitutes a fundamental right or a suspect classifi-
cation. For example, in Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 950-51 (Cal. 1976) (Serrano II), the
California Supreme Court rejected the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence as explicated in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973). The California court declared that, under California's independent juris-
prudence, education would indeed be recognized as a fundamental right and wealth would
be added to the list of suspect classifications triggering strict scrutiny. Id. at 950-52.
A small number of state courts reject the federal approach entirely and seek to de-
velop their own independent jurisprudence. See, e.g., Williams, supra, at 1219, 1220
("Courts that have employed an independent analysis of state equal protection claims have
done so under one of two methodologies ... under the second, courts reject the federal
constructs and apply their own analytical framework.").
Plaintiff's may find that arguments which were compelling but ultimately unsuccessful
at the federal level are successful in state courts where the state constitutions provide
greater protection for individuals in the area of equality than do the federal courts.
Virtually every state constitution contains provisions guaranteeing some form of pub-
lic education for its residents. While education is not mentioned at all in the U.S. Constitu-
tion, it has traditionally been viewed as an integral component of state constitutional law.
See, e.g., Allen W. Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education
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the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.115
Applying discriminatory effects principles in a school choice con-
text, plaintiffs challenging new programs will find that several viable
approaches for litigation exist. Parents and students can seek to maxi-
mize both equity and excellence by ultimately relying on the basic
proposition that every American should have equal access to a quality
education.
H. The Transportation Hurdle: Limited Access for Students
from Certain Geographical Areas
Choice proposals create a wide range of educational options for
parents of K-12 students. Yet most of these plans, including the proto-
typical enabling statutes for charter schools, fail to provide mandatory
funding for transportation.1 6 In an era of severe budgetary con-
straints, transportation problems are typically left to individual fami-
lies. This allows parents to choose schools for their sons and
daughters, but only if they can get the children there by themselves." 7
Under State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 134-40 (1989) (setting forth the educa-
tion provisions of the 50 state constitutions). Some of these education provisions contain
broad general language setting forth the minimum requirements of a school system.
Others include specific guarantees of "thoroughness," "efficiency," or both. See Thro,
supra, at 1661-63. Litigants in the area of school finance have relied upon these specific
guarantees to win key victories. In Kentucky, for example, plaintiffs focused entirely on
the word efficient in the Kentucky Constitution. The state supreme court determined not
only that the Kentucky school finance system was inefficien, but found the entire state
school system unconstitutional. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186
(Ky. 1989). More recently, in Massachusetts, the state's highest court based its decision to
overturn school funding laws solely on the constitutional duty of "legislatures and magis-
trates" to "cherish... the public schools." See McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive
Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 527 (Mass. 1993) (emphasis added) (referring to a duty
imposed by the Massachusetts Constitution).
115. See infra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
116. The 1993 California Parental Choice in Education Initiative, for example, states
that "[t]he Legislature may award supplemental funds for reasonable transportation needs
for low-income children," but does not require such funds. See Cal. Prop. 174, Section 17
(2). Similarly, under the plan set forth by John Chubb and Terry Moe, "[t]o the extent that
tax revenues allow, every effort will be made to provide transportation for students that
need it." Yet transportation is not mandated. See CHUBB & MoE, supra note 13, at 221.
With the exception of Massachusetts, which has created charter schools under a wide-
ranging reform act that includes desegregation components, charter school legislation typi-
cally includes no provisions for transportation. See generally Wells, supra note 10, at 123.
117. Cf Ramona Ripston, A Measure Built on a Foundation of Lies, L.A. TIMES, Sep-
tember 7, 1993, at B5 (arguing that California Proposition 174's "clever wording could
deny transportation to poor inner-city children who wanted to attend out-of-area private
or public schools, effectively barring their enrollment"). See also Mitgang, supra note 26
("most states and districts have shied away from the expense of offering much transporta-
tion help").
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Many residents of large urban metropolitan areas will be placed
at a severe disadvantage by parental choice in education. Children of
poverty who cannot pay for their own transportation and students of
color who live in the inner city are most likely to be injured by these
programs. Without equal access to the full range of public and private
options that become available, these students face the prospect of be-
coming "leftover" students at the schools that very few others want to
choose. 118
Key legal and policy arguments are available to these students
under the Title VI disparate impact model, 19 which provides liti-
gants with a viable framework for challenging choice programs that do
not include reasonable transportation costs for families living below
the poverty line or in distant locations. 120
118. See, e.g., The Students Left Behind, N.Y. Tin~s, July 4, 1992, at A18 (Op-Ed)
(referencing President Bush's "state and local G.I. Bills for Children," the editorial states
that "since the $1,000.00 [voucher] travels with the student, and since the President offers
nothing to the schools left behind, the plan would inevitably create new imbalances in the
system").
119. See supra, notes 58-86 and accompanying text.
In a private school choice context, an initial inquiry under Title VI would focus on
whether the federal funds requirement is satisfied. Title VI provides that no person shall,
"on the ground of race, color or national origin," be excluded, denied benefits, or be "sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance." Id. (emphasis added). School choice proponents might be willing to stipulate that
Title VI controls public school choice programs and charter schools, but they are likely to
contend that private decisions by parents in a deregulated private sector fall outside the
requirements of the statute. Plaintiffs will prevail, however, by explaining that relevant
federal civil rights statutes control the policies and practices at all schools in a choice pro-
gram because federal funds will undoubtedly constitute a portion of the money that states
use to fund school vouchers. See, e.g., CHUBB & MOE, supra note 13, at 219. Cf Liebman,
supra note 6, at 288 ("By becoming state actors, schools subject themselves to the Bill of
Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the various statutory burdens of actors on the left
side of the public-private divide.").
120. Prospective plaintiffs in this context may also wish to consider litigation under the
federal Equal Protection Clause. Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Kadrmas v.
Dickinson Public Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988), appears to be a significant hurdle in this regard,
the Kadrmas case may be distinguishable.
In Kadrmas, parents argued that a North Dakota statute allowing districts to begin
charging for optional door-to-door bus transportation should trigger heightened judicial
review under the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiff, a poor family living sixteen miles from
the nearest public elementary school, contended that the district's failure to provide free
transportation in a rural setting infringed upon the equal educational opportunity rights of
their daughter. Id. at 454-55. By a 5-4 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected these argu-
ments and ruled in favor of the district. Id. at 465. However, it can be argued that trans-
portation in a citywide, countywide, or statewide choice system differs from the North
Dakota district's door-to-door bus transportation in one very significant respect. The
Dickinson School District did provide transportation at a minimal cost of $97.00 a year,
along with a procedure for waiving the fee entirely which was expressly made available to
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A.. Prima Fade Case
To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VI
and its applicable regulations, plaintiffs must "demonstrate that... [a]
particular... practice"' 21 serves to disqualify a disproportionate per-
centage of a protected class'2 for the benefit at issue.'23 Defendants
may then seek to employ the affirmative defense of educational neces-
sity, but, plaintiffs may still successfully counter by substantiating the
existence of less discriminatory alternatives. 24
Litigants focusing on the disparate impact of a school choice pro-
gram in this context must show that a lack of reasonable transporta-
tion costs, at least for the needy, disqualifies a disproportionate
number of minority students from attending certain schools.
A recent University of California, Los Angeles study completed
for the Western Center on Law and Poverty found that many of Los
Angeles County's homeless and working poor cannot afford the cost
of travel necessary to receive basic social services.'25 Ninety per cent
of those surveyed said they had no car and could not afford $42 for a
bus pass because it would consume 10% or more of their monthly
income.12 6
The report states that "[tIransportation for the impoverished is
filled with contradictions. [Mobility is] available, yet unaffordable to
those with no money. Public welfare is available, yet requires mobility
to fulfill the requirements. And social services are available yet inac-
cessible to those who lack mobility."' 27
residents under the statute in question. Id. at 454. School choice systems, however, typi-
cally do not include provisions for school buses or any form of transportation. In a deregu-
lated environment, parents may very well be on their own. The late Justice Marshall's
words in Kadrmas are even more applicable in a choice context: "[A]llowing a State to
burden the access of poor persons to an education ... denies equal opportunity and dis-
courages hope. I do not believe the Equal Protection Clause countenances such a result."
487 U.S. at 471 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Compelling legal arguments may also be avail-
able to plaintiffs in this regard under state constitutional law. See supra note 122 and ac-
companying text.
121. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
122. The federal courts have adopted various formulae to measure the degree of statis-
tical disparity in any particular case. See, e.g., Groves v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 776
F. Supp. 1518, 1526-28 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (documenting three basic approaches-the
EEOC approach, the standard-deviation analysis, and the "Shoben formula").
123. See Sonn, supra note 76, at 1597.
124. See, Less Discriminatory Alternatives, supra note 68, at 1626-28.
125. Shawn Hubler, Study Says Poor Lack Mobility to Obtain Aid, L.A. Tms, Aug.
22, 1992, at B3.
126. Id.
127. 1d. (quoting UCLA study).
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Many minority families in a publicly funded choice system would
face similar problems getting their children to schools that are not
within walking distance. In a Title VI lawsuit, these families would
seek to demonstrate, through an analysis of statistical disparities, that
members of their protected class were disproportionately denied
equal access to local educational institutions because they could not
get to these school sites. Compelling evidence documenting these in-
equities would include census data regarding family income and place
of residence, tables showing the location of current public and private
schools, and relevant studies based on personal interviews. 128 Once
the disparities are set forth, plaintiffs would complete a prima facie
case by focusing on the causal link between the choice program and
the disparities. 129
B. Causation: The Link between the "Practice" and the Disparate
Impact
Minority plaintiffs living in poverty must demonstrate that there
is a direct causal link between the "practice" of establishing a state-
run choice system with no provisions for transportation and a result-
ing disparate impact on the quality of education received by their
children. 130
128. Evidence presented would vary depending on whether the lawsuit focused on pro-
spective disparities and sought only declaratory relief, or whether the lawsuit was filed
after actual disparities had become apparent. While the federal Declaratory Judgment
Act, 28 U.S.C. section 2001 (Supp. V 1993), requires the showing of an actual controversy
as a condition to obtaining declaratory relief, the courts have held that a "clear threat" of
the application of a provision in the future is enough to establish the requisite controversy.
See, e.g., Postscript Enterprises, Inc. v. Westfall, 771 F.2d 1132, 1136 (8th Cir. 1985) ("Ap-
pellants have sufficiently shown the existence of an immediate threat that the statute will
be enforced against them to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III and
the Declaratory Judgment Act."). See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2757 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
For a discussion of declaratory judgments pertaining specifically to civil rights litiga-
tion, see 6 FEDERAL PROCEDURE LAWYER'S EDITION §§ 11:61 - 11:64 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
129. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that "a respondent
uses a particular . . . practice that causes a disparate impact." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp.V 1993) (emphasis added). See also Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of
Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir. 1993) ("The [Title VI] plaintiff's duty to show that a
practice has a disproportionate effect by definition requires the plaintiff to demonstrate a
causal link between the defendant's challenged practice and the disparate impact
identified.").
130. The "benefit at issue" in Title VI school choice litigation would be comprised of
two inextricably linked components: (1) a wider range of choices, and (2) a higher quality
of education generally.
In Title VI education cases, plaintiffs must clearly identify the nature and extent of the
benefits that have been allocated in a disproportionate manner. See Elston v. Talladega
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All school choice programs promise families a greater number of
options. Yet parents living in the inner city, with little or no money
available for transporting their children, will not have equal access to
this benefit. They simply will not be able to choose from the same
wide range of educational options as families in other neighborhoods
who have more transportation money available and may very well be
much closer to a larger number of schools. 131
Without the ability to get to the same number of schools as other
persons with greater resources, 132 plaintiffs' choices are limited to the
schools in their immediate neighborhoods-schools which may very
well deteriorate as those children who afe able to leave start enrolling
elsewhere. 133
Defendants are likely to respond to this claim by attempting to
demonstrate that a choice system with a lack of transportation will not
cause or has not caused a disparate impact within the meaning of Title
VI and its applicable regulations. Defendants will maintain that there
is nothing inherent in the concept of school choice that would cause a
neighborhood school to deteriorate.' 34 Indeed, private school choice
County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1405-06 (11th Cir. 1993) (decision-making regarding
new school site construction and school attendance zones); Georgia State Conference of
Branches of NAACP v. Georgia; 775 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1985) (tracking and homogene-
ous ability grouping); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984) (placement of minority
students in regular or "special" classes based on IQ test performance).
131. Professor James Liebman argues, for example, that "[t]here is reason to fear...
that... voucher... plans will make today's socially stratified situation worse." See Lieb-
man, supra note 6, at 284 (speaking specifically of "uncapped voucher and tax credit
plans"). See also Richard Rothstein, Class Warfare and the Public Schools, L.A. WEEKLY,
March 20, 1992, at 11 ("Since public schools will enroll students based on parental choice,
it will segregate the remaining public schools into those for middle-class parents (who can
afford transportation and are aware of options) and those for parents too poor").
132. Resources can include both money and access to information. See Olson, supra
note 8 ("Many of the statewide programs that permit choice between districts, for example,
fail to provide sufficient money for transportation or adequate information to allow par-
ents to make informed choices.").
133. Cf. The Children Left Behind, supra note 26. See also Mitgang, supra note 26, at
29 (describing relevant findings from "School Choice," the report of the Carnegie Founda-
tion for the Advancement of Teaching:
Even more alarming is the ruinous competition we discovered in states where
choice pits poor districts against neighboring ones with higher per-pupil spending
and smaller class sizes. Districts like Exira, Iowa; Gloucester and Hopkington,
Massachusetts; Motley, Minnesota; and Batesville, Arkansas are among some of
the early casualties that have lost students and state aid to better-off neighbors.)
134. David Boaz, executive vice president of the Cato Institute and editor of LIBERAT-
ING ScHooLs: EIucAnoN IN Ta INNER Crry, argues that such criticisms reflect "a misun-
derstanding of the situation in our schools today." Choice, he claims, "would have the
greatest ... [positive] ... effects in the inner city." See David Boaz, Five Myths About
School Choice, EDUC. WK., Jan. 27, 1993, at 36.
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and a variety of public school choice programs are predicated upon
the viability of free market principles which assume that educators
afraid of losing students will take the initiative and work hand-in-hand
with the community to improve their educational programs. 135
The counterargument by the plaintiffs will explain that such initi-
ative is not guaranteed by current school choice proposals, and that
the local school may simply drift for an extended period of time while
students continue to leave. Educators are notorious for responding
slowly, if at all, to changes in the world around them.136
Choice proponents will also assert that brand-new educational in-
stitutions or innovative charter schools might very well become avail-
able within the plaintiffs' own neighborhood. Proponents argue that,
especially in the case of private school choice, the combination of
voucher money and substantial deregulation will lead to exciting new
variations in education that can more effectively address the special
needs of young people in a particular community. 137
Plaintiff families can successfully contend, however, that it is very
difficult to start a new school. Those who seek to create these new
schools must begin by building or obtaining a functional school site-
a process that typically requires extensive capital and a tremendous
amount of time.138 Funds may be particularly difficult to obtain for
135. See Wells, supra note 10, at 96-97.
136. A myriad of sources are available to document the pathological failure of many
educators to respond to change. Indeed, even after experts have identified urgent policy
imperatives, school districts have often hesitated, equivocated, and ultimately accom-
plished only marginal reforms. See, e.g., Marshall S. Smith & Jennifer A. O'Day, School
Reform and Equal Opportunity: An Introduction to the Education Symposium, 4 STAN. L.
& POL. REV. 15 (1992-1993) (analyzing the implications of a "model of state systemic re-
form"). See also CHUBB & MOE, supra note 13, at 1-68 (documenting the pervasive nega-
tive effects of public school bureaucracy).
137. See, e.g., CHUBB & MOE, supra note 13, at 221-22. Cf James P. Pinkerton, Offer-
ing Hope to Children in School, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 3, 1993, at B7 (discussing California
Proposition 174 which "offers hope, in the form of a voucher, to every school-age child in
California").
Defendants may also contend that the benefit at issue is not the same number of
choices, but simply a larger number of choices. Proponents of parental choice often analo-
gize to the area of higher education, where one student does not necessarily have the same
number of options as another student, but where all students have a larger number of
choices than they would have if they were forced to attend only one educational institu-
tion. Such a pattern, according to these proponents, would also emerge at the K-12 level,
and all students would benefit to a greater extent than they might have before school
choice. In addition to the above arguments, defendants will likely assert that any limita-
tions from a lack of transportation are more than counterbalanced by the potential benefits
of school choice programs.
138. For an overview of all the steps and resources required to start a new school, see
BONNIE SCHREITER, THE ABC's OF STARTING A PRIVATE SCHOOL (1982).
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new schools in depressed neighborhoods where people are tradition-
ally unwilling to invest. 139 Finally, competent teachers, administra-
tors, and support staff must be recruited and hired. Even assuming
that the builders of these new neighborhood schools can overcome all
the initial hurdles, there is no guarantee that the education provided
will be particularly effective. Throughout this entire process, which
may take years to unfold, neighborhood children may still be forced to
attend the closest public school.14o
Although, proponents of school choice invariably argue that their
programs would lead to a higher quality education for all,14 ' many
children of poverty who cannot travel will be forced to attend a deteri-
139. Investors have traditionally been unwilling to fund projects in depressed neigh-
borhoods, citing both economic and safety considerations. Cf Eric Mann, Los Angeles-A
YearAfter- The Poverty of Corporatism, 256 TH- NATION 406 (1993) (discussing the secret,
closed-door industrial/corporate plans of Rebuild Los Angeles (R.L.A., a non-profit corpo-
ration), Peter Ueberroth (its then head), and Tom Bradley's "much-heralded revitalization
program"). See also Brian Dumaine, Blacks on Blacks, FORTUNE, Nov. 2, 1992, at 118.
140. Defendants would be expected to assert a classic Darwinian argument at this
stage. It is wrong, defenders of choice programs will maintain, to blame other persons and
governmental entities for one's own problems. Society already provides a wide range of
support systems to help people get started. At some point, the argument goes, people need
to take responsibility for their own lives and find a way to make things work. Particularly
in the case of school choice, where greater options are available, children of color living in
poverty will arguably have greater opportunities to get ahead. Such an argument is effec-
tively countered, however, by countless studies documenting the inability of poor people to
effectively get ahead in American society today. See generally Keith Bradsher, America's
Opportunity Gap, N.Y. Trms, June 4, 1995, at E4; Sylvia Nasar, Rich and Poor Likely to
Remain So, N.Y. TiMms, May 18, 1992, at DI ("Though many doors and many rewards are
open to talent, being rich or poor is more likely than not to carry over from generation to
generation, and certainly from year to year."). See also Riley, supra note 13, at 556 ("for
most parents, the primary factors in making ... [school choice] ... decisions are not
academic. They are religion-, race-, or even class-oriented.") (emphasis added); Wells,
supra note 6, at 140-47 (documenting what history and research "have taught us" regarding
race, class, and school choice).
141. The focus on higher educational quality by choice proponents parallels both the
efforts of reformers to identify national standards and the increasing emphasis on educa-
tional adequacy by plaintiffs in school finance litigation. Cf. William Celis, I, The Fight
Over National Standards, N.Y. Tnvms, Aug. 1, 1993, at 14; Lonnie Harp, School-Finance
Suits Look Beyond Money to Issues of Quality, EDUC. WK., June 17, 1992, at 1. School
choice, national standards, and educational adequacy lawsuits are the latest chapters in the
ongoing equity versus excellence debate. See James S. Catterall, Contemporary School
Reforms and Equality of Educational Opportunity, 3 U.C.L.A. J. EDUC. 27, 31-34 (1989).,
Particularly in the school finance arena, advocates for poor students are beginning to
scrutinize programs and achievement measures as they search for objective indicators of
educational quality. See Harp, supra ("This idea calls for a shift from a drive for 'equity'-
reducing the spending disparities between schools in wealthy and poor areas-to 'ade-
quacy'-ensuring that the schools can provide each child with an opportunity for success in
life." See also William Celis, III, School Financing: Arguing Equity is Not Enough, N.Y.
TiMEs, April 29, 1992, at B8 (quoting Judge David S. Tatel, a former lawyer specializing in
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orating neighborhood school which may have lost a significant
number of its best students to other educational institutions through
school choice. In light of these realities, a prima facie case under Title
VI and its applicable administrative regulations must ultimately be
based on the disproportionate negative impact of a choice program on
the quality of a student's education.
school finance issues, who declared that the increasing focus on adequacy is the "cutting
edge of education litigation.")
The contrast between education and other professions is striking. "Professionals" typ-
ically work under much stricter guidelines and are subject to a significantly higher level of
accountability than educators. "Hit-or-miss" approaches are not tolerated and often con-
stitute "malpractice" in the professional environment. In the business community, ineffi-
ciency can be grounds for dismissal. In contrast, many educators are allowed to justify
their actions by asserting that they have "always" done it this way.
Too often both teachers and administrators resemble prototypical bureaucrats who
"put in their time" and maintain the appearance of "business-as-usual" while achieving
only minimal results. These educators continue to influence the lives of America's young
people in an arbitrary and capricious fashion. If there are no complaints (or even very few
complaints) from parents, students, or other teachers, K-12 educators are required to do
only the following: (1) conduct classes that appear to be orderly; (2) have the students
work on material related to the curriculum; (3) assign homework on a regular basis; (4) test
students on material in the required textbooks; (5) "get to" a certain point in the content
area; and (6) assign grades based on a certain number of scores that have been entered in
the roll book.
Americans are now demanding greater accountability from their schools. There is an
emerging consensus in this country about the magnitude of problems in the education com-
munity. Americans are recognizing the urgent need to identify minimum standards for
school districts, educators, and students, as well as the importance of involving both stu-
dents and teachers in the decision-making process by establishing communities of learners
and communities of practice. Significant reform and restructuring efforts are currently
under way in this regard. See, e.g., CREATING NEW EDUCATIONAL COMMUNITIES, THE
94TH YEARBOOK OF THE NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF EDUCATION (Jeannie
Oakes & Karen Hunter Quartz eds., 1995) (employing education communities as a term of
art to pinpoint ways that people can work together as both learners and practitioners in a
school reform context).
However, if school districts and state legislatures continue to resist change, courts may
be willing to foster accountability by adopting an expanded definition of "educational mal-
practice." Many judges with children of their own might be eager to enforce this cause of
action by granting mandatory or prohibitory injunctions. Certain common practices in the
day-to-day educational process can and should be called "malpractice." The key to suc-
cessful legal action in this area would be the identification of a consensus. Most people
must agree that the identified practices are not only improper, but detrimental and
counterproductive.
During the past ten years, scholars have identified legal frameworks that would be
available to plaintiffs who seek equal access to a quality education, focusing on both equity
and excellence. See Bitensky, supra note 57; James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the
Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legisla-
tive Reform, 76 VA. L. REV. 349, 381 (1990) (setting forth a new strategy for
desegregation).
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C. Affirmative Defense Stage: Educational Necessity
If plaintiffs succeed in establishing a prima face case, the case
shifts to the affirmative defense stage.142 Defendant must then
demonstrate the "educational necessity" of the policies and practices
at issue.143 The Eleventh Circuit recently declared that such a demon-
stration requires a defendant to "show [(1)] that the challenged course
of action is demonstrably necessary to meeting an important educa-
tional goal... [and (2) that the necessity is] a substantial legitimate
justification for the challenged practice." 144
After establishing the fact that their "important goal" is nothing
less than the improvement of all the schools in a given jurisdiction,
defendants would seek to prove that a choice system-even with no
provisions for transportation-is clearly necessary to meet such a
goal.
Courts in Title VI education cases have elaborated on the defini-
tion of necessity, explaining that it must be justified by a legitimate
educational rationale,1 45 and must bear a manifest and demonstrable
relationship to classroom education.1 46 "Manifest" is often defined as
"self-evident" and "unmistakable." Defendants can thus argue that
their choice system, even without transportation, would still be a self-
evident and unmistakably positive improvement over a system that
may have provided transportation under a desegregation plan but
which allowed little or no freedom to choose schools.1 47
Two "substantial justifications" for such practices, based on "le-
gitimate educational rationale," would then be set forth: the market
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
143. The courts have determined that the "business necessity" component of the Title
VI/Title VII framework appropriately becomes an inquiry into "educational necessity."
See NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417-18 (11th Cir. 1985) ("This [educational neces-
sity] justification is analogous to the 'business necessity' exception in Title VII cases.");
Less Discriminatory Alternatives, supra note 68, at 1625 (noting that the Civil Rights Act of
1991 is somewhat "vague" regarding the degree of substantiation necessary for a "business-
necessity defense").
144. Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1412 (11th Cir. 1993).
145. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 142 (1979).
146. See Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F2d at 982 n.9 ("a manifest relationship to the education
in question"); NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d at 1418 ("a manifest demonstrable relation-
ship to classroom education").
147. Defendants are likely to characterize their "practice" in these terms, rather than
focusing only on the "necessity" of providing transportation. Few courts are likely to find
that the practice of denying transportation has a "manifest relationship to the education in
question." Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d at 982 n.9.
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forces theory and the school organization analysis. 148 The market
forces theory has been relied upon by proponents of choice for the
past two hundred years. Adam Smith and Thomas Paine proposed
deregulated educational plans in the eighteenth century, and John
Stuart Mill argued in favor of tuition vouchers nearly one hundred
years later.149 The school organization analysis focuses on the bureau-
cracy that inhibits the performance of so many public schools and con-
cludes that a deregulated educational environment accompanied by
"innovations" such as school vouchers and charter schools would
make a tremendous difference.150
At this stage, the lawsuit is likely to become a proverbial "battle
of experts." Since 1990 many commentators in the education commu-
nity have debated the efficacy of the market forces and school organi-
zation arguments. 151 Both arguments of choice proponents remain
hypothetical. There is virtually no empirical evidence available to
support a finding that market forces will improve "classroom educa-
tion" in America's schools. 152 A school is not like a department store.
If a family does not like the prices, the service or the selection at one
department store, it can easily decide to shop at another. Moving to a
different school is not an easy switch. Beyond the transportation is-
sue, children may be unwilling to leave their friends behind.153 In ad-
148. For an overview and exploration of the market forces theory, see generally Riley,
supra note 13, at 548-67 (1990). For an example of the school organization analysis, see
CHUBB & MOE, supra note 13, at 47-68.
149. See Wells & Biegel, supra note 14, at 218-19; Peter K. Rofes, Public Law, Private
School: Choice, the Constitution, and Some Emerging Issues, 21 J.L. & EDUC. 503, 508-09
(1992).
150. See CHUBB & MOE, supra note 13, at 69-100. See also WELLS, supra note 10, at
121-26. See generally ROALD F. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF
AMERICAN SCHOOLS (5th ed. 1985); RICHARD F. ELMORE, RESTRUCTURING SCHOOLS:
THE NEXT GENERATION OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1990).
151. See, e.g., Peter W. Cookson, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools: A Review,
93 TCHRS. C. REc. 156 (1991); Rofes, supra note 149; Chira, supra note 7. See generally
Liebman, supra note 6.
152. See, e.g., Dennis L. Evans, The Mythology of the Marketplace in School Choice,
EDUC. WK., Oct. 17, 1990, at 32 (lamenting the dearth of empirical evidence supporting the
choice system and asserting that "good intentions are no guarantee of good decisions").
153. Professor Riley reports that
the decision to leave one high school for another is rarely an easy one to make
and involves things far removed from academics. Such a decision has all sorts of
implications for peer relationships-romantic and otherwise. It also affects op-
portunities for extracurricular participation. A smaller high school has fewer tal-
ented folks to choose from, whatever the activity might be. Then there is the
teenager's fear of the unknown. (Parents aren't too terribly confident about it
either). There may be problems at their high school, but at least they know what
they are.
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dition, enrollment opportunities may be severely limited at the
schools of choice. With regard to the school organization analysis,
some have argued that school choice may actually result in a larger
and more unwieldy bureaucracy than currently exists.154 Given the
lack of consensus in these areas, it is unlikely that defendants will suc-
ceed in demonstrating that their practices lead unmistakably and in a
self-evident manner to better education for the young people of the
community.
Even if necessity is shown by a Title VI defendant, plaintiffs may
still win if they can demonstrate that other practices, without a simi-
larly undesirable effect, would also serve the institution's legitimate
interests. 155 Many less discriminatory alternatives are available for
plaintiffs in this context, both within the framework of school choice
and through a broad-based plan for improving education as a
whole. 56 An equally effective, less discriminatory choice system has
been outlined in detail by Professors John Coons and Stephen
Sugarman. Their proposed choice system includes special attention to
the needs of low-income families and requires that the government
pay reasonable transportation costs for the poorest twenty percent of
persons with school-age children. 57
See Riley, supra note 13, at 556.
154. See e.g., Frank R. Kemerer et al., Vouchers and Private SchoolAutonomy, 21 J. L.
& EDuC. 601, 606-13 (1992) (analyzing the "legal implications of a voucher program for
private school autonomy" and specifically focusing on the Milwaukee program).
155. See, e.g., NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d at 1420-21. See generally Sonn, supra note
76, at 1599-1600 (analogizing to plaintiff's "showing of a less discriminatory alternative" in
Title VII cases).
156. Notable examples of the many recent documents focusing on plans for improving
education as a whole include: Linda Darling-Hammond, Refraining the School Reform
Agenda, 74 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 752 (1993) (advocating democratic dialogue to facilitate
education in the information age); James P. Comer, Educational Accountability: A Shared
Responsibility Between Parents and Schools, 4 STAN. L. & PoL'Y Rav. 113 (1992-93) (advo-
cating a more active role for parents in educational institutions). Three particularly influ-
ential books in this regard are: ERNEST L. BOYER, HIGH SCHOOL (1983) (setting forth a
series of proposal to promote school revival and reform to U.S. educators); JEANNIE
OAKEs, KEEPING TRACic How SCHOOLS STRucTURE INEQUALrrY (1985) (analyzing the
problems inherent in school "tracking" both for higher and lower achievers); and THEo-
DORE R SIZER, HORACE'S COMPROMISE: THE DILEMMA OF THE AMERICAN HIGH
SCHOOL 4 (1985) (recommending "renewed public attention to the importance of teaching
in high schools and the complexity and subtlety of that craft."); See generally Comparison
Recommendations from Selected Education Reform Reports in YUDoF ET AL., supra note 9,
at 817-27.
157. Professors Coons and Sugarman's school choice system demands that "[tihe pro-
visions of any system of educational choice must 'tilt' toward the poor to ensure they have
both the opportunity to escape from schools that ill-serve them and fair access to schools
they prefer." COONS & SUGARMAN, supra note 26, at 3. They further explain that a
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In recent years, few Title VI cases have been filed in the educa-
tion context. However, because disparate impact jurisprudence has
been strengthened by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, students of color
who are denied equal access in a new school choice system may find
that the current Title VI discriminatory effects framework will provide
them with a substantial advantage in federal court.
111. Restrictive Admissions Practices: The Pervasive Role of
Standardized Testing
Once a choice plan has been implemented and an educational
system has been deregulated, admissions practices at individual
schools will become a likely focus of litigation. Proponents consist-
ently argue that choice programs will provide all families with the
right to choose. Yet it is clear that the only right granted to parents
and students in this context is the right to apply to the schools of their
choice. The schools themselves will ultimately make the choices, and
admissions committees can be expected to rely heavily on test scores.
These traditional "objective" indicators raise a variety of legal and
policy concerns.
A. Standardized Testing in America Today
Testing requirements are already a central feature of the applica-
tion process at many K-12 schools 158 and it is reasonable to assume
that such practices will proliferate if school choice is implemented.
Admissions officers at schools that are considered desirable will un-
doubtedly wish to rely, at least in part, on test scores before making
final decisions. Administrators at schools that are eager to become
more "desirable" will simultaneously seek to admit students whose
test-taking skills are already highly developed knowing that the qual-
"Scholarship Initiative adds a reasonable transportation increment as a further preference
for the poor. This is obviously important if the system is to secure choice for all families,
effectively threaten all inefficient operators, and maximize the initiative's potential impact
upon class and racial segregation." Id. at 28.
158. Many private schools at the K-12 level require applicants to submit certain stan-
dardized test scores before their files will be reviewed. Certain unique public school envi-
ronments have similar requirements. See generally BANESH HOFFMANN, THE TYRIrNNY OF
TESTING (1964) (characterizing standardized testing as an "inexpensive substitute" for "in-
formed judgment"); NOE MEDINA & D. MorT NEILL, FALLOUT FROM THE TESTING Ex-
PLOSION: How 100 MILLION STANDARDIZED EXAMS UNDERMINE EOUrrY AND
EXCELLENCE IN AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (3d ed. 1992) (a publication of the National
Center for Fair and Open Testing); Grant Wiggins, Assessment. Authenticity, Context, and
Validity, 75 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 200, 206 (1993) (urging that "[tihe criterion of a good test
is its congruence with reality").
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ity of the school's instructional program is likely to be measured at a
later point in time by the performance of these same students on stan-
dardized achievement tests.' 59
Although many people view standardized testing as the most ef-
fective method available to measure student competencies and foster
increased accountability, 60 a large number of commentators and edu-
cational practitioners have criticized the growing reliance on test data
in the American educational system.' 6' Some commentators question
the efficacy of reform efforts that place such an undue emphasis on
testing for monitoring and certification.162 Others focus on the order-
ing of priorities in the classroom' 63 and the consequences of relying on
multiple-choice tests to such a great extent.164 Finally, some commen-
159. Ongoing schoolwide achievement testing, to assess the quality of instruction, is an
integral feature of current choice proposals. The Bush Administration's "America 2000"
school choice proposal, for example, included standardized testing as an integral compo-
nent. See AMERICA 2000: A SOURCEBOOK (1991) (on file with the author).
160. See, eg., A Sterner Test for Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1992, at A18 (Op-Ed)
(outlining new math tests which emphasize problem solving rather than multiple choice
guessing).
161. Se4 e.g., Muriel Cohen, Test Questions: A Subject for the Nineties, BOsTON
GLOBE, Dec. 2, 1990, at A33 ("Americans are hooked on scores .... Political leaders,
school administrators, teachers, parents and students look to scores on widely used stan-
dardized tests to measure the performance of individual students and the effectiveness of
schools. Tests are failing on both counts, according to critics. .. "). See generally F. ALLAN
HANSON, TESTING TESTING: SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXAMINED Lum 5 (1993)
("[N]ever before has any society deployed such a rich and ingenious panoply of dedicated
techniques to scan, weigh, peruse, probe and record the minutiae of its members' personal
traits and life experiences.").
162. In a 1992 report mandated by Congress, the U.S. Office of Technology explains
that:
by the 1989-1990 school year, 47 states had mandated standardized testing. And
even in the three states that had not, many districts required standardized tests
.... In Pennsylvania, for example, 91 percent of districts used standardized test
even though there was no state testing requirement. The report concludes that
"standardized testing is an enemy of innovation" and that it "threatens to under-
mine many promising classroom reform efforts."
See OFrCE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TESTING IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS: ASKING THE
RIGHT QUESTIONS (Summary Report - Congress of the United States) (1992) (hereinafter
OTA REPORT).
See also D. Monty Neill, Assessment and the 'Educational Impact Statement'" EDUC.
WK., Sept. 23, 1992, at 28 ("The testing explosion of the past two decades has not produced
the school improvement its proponents promised. The only clear result is that U.S. stu-
dents are now the most heavily tested in the world.").
163. See e.g., Robert E. Slavin, 'Better Assessments' the Key, Euc. WK., June 17,1992,
at 520 ("At present, the use of standardized tests drives curriculum and instruction toward
narrow teaching of splinter skills.").
164. See generally Anne McGill-Franzen & Richard Allington, Flunk 'Em or Get Them
Classified, EDUC. RESEARCHER, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 19. See also Walt Haney & George F.
Madaus, Making Sense of the Competency Testing Movement, 48 HARv. EDUC. REv. 462
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tators decry an overall system of selection and placement that is so
heavily weighted "in favor of applicants who test well.' 65
Children who are denied admission to desired schools in a state-
mandated "choice system" on the basis of poorly standardized test
scores can rely on federal law to challenge the validity of testing pro-
grams and practices. 166
B. The Concept of Test Validity
Broadly defined, "[v]alidity refers to whether [test] instrument[s
or testing programs] measure . . .what [they] purport . . . to mea-
(1978) ("tests can very easily come to determine skills taught, rather than having desired
skills guide the selection of appropriate assessment techniques."); Wiggins, supra note 158,
at 202 ("The simplest way to sum up the potential harm of our current tests is to say that
we are not preparing students for real, 'messy' uses of knowledge in context--the 'doing'
of a subject .... That is because all our testing is based on a simplistic stimulus/response
view of learning.").
In recent years, there has been a significant trend toward including authentic, per-
formance-based assessments in district wide and statewide testing programs. See, e.g., Wig-
gins, supra note 158, at 202-11 (tracing the arguments for performance-based testing and
discussing several implementations); OTA REPORT, supra note 162, at 18-20 (detailing
testing methods based on performance assessment). However, even in light of this growing
trend, multiple-choice tests still dominate the testing landscape.
The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment warns that "[olne of the most vexing
problems in testing policy is how to prevent test misuse, principally the application of a test
to purposes for which it was not designed." OTA REPORT, supra note 162, at 14-15.
165. See Manuel J. Diaz, Standardized Testing: Role-Playing as a Barrier to Education,
5 U.C.L.A. J. EDUC. 105-11 (Summer 1991) (documenting from first-hand experience the
testing "barriers" faced by poor and minority students).
One commentator declares that,
[I]n a very real sense, tests have invented all of us. They play an important role in
determining what opportunities are offered to or withheld from us, they mold the
expectations and evaluations that others form of us (and we form of them), and
they heavily influence our assessments of our own abilities and worth. Therefore,
although testing is usually considered to be a means of appraising qualities that
are already present in a person, in actuality the individual in contemporary soci-
ety is not so much measured by tests as constructed by them.
F. Allan Hanson, The Invention of Intelligence, EDUC. WK., Sept. 15, 1993, at 40.
See generally Michael Winerip, Now, PSAT Means Pressure: Call It Pre-Preliminary
Test Anxiety, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1993. at B6.
166. Since the major testing decisions apply only to public schools or to institutions
that receive federal funds, current private school applicants are precluded from relying on
these precedents. However, under a school voucher program, equal protection guarantees
would apply to these applicants as well. The admissions practices of all schools in a pub-
licly-funded "choice system" are likely to qualify as state action. In addition, the relevant
federal civil rights statutes would control testing at these schools because federal funds will
undoubtedly constitute a portion of the money that states use to fund a choice program.
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sure."' 67 It is generally agreed that any analysis of test validity must
focus on the appropriateness of the inferences from a given test.168
Experts have identified key questions that such an analysis should
contain:
Does... [the test] ... confuse one kind of skill or knowledge with
another? ... Does... [it] ... assess that which is most important to
measure or what is really needed? What knowledge or abilities do
students who do poorly have that are not measured? Does the test
... embody a standard that is fair to all test takers? Are the knowl-
edge and skills tested the right ones by which to judge the thing
assumed to be judged by the test questions? 169
The Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests (APA
Standards) identify three general categories of validity: (1) content
validity (a measure of how well the test items represent the knowledge
that the test purports to measure), (2) construct validity (a measure of
how well the test items correlate to the theory behind the test), and
(3) criterion-related validity (a measure of either predictive validity or
concurrent validity).170 Challenges to reliance on testing and test
167. See Merle Steven McClung, Competency Testing Programs: Legal and Educa-
tional Issues, 47 FoRDHAm L. REv. 651, 666 (1979) (exploring the legal and educational
issues involved in basic skills competency testing).
168. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL AssoCIATION, STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS 25-26 (1974) [hereinafter APA STANDARDS]. The APA found
that "[q]uestions of validity are questions of what may properly be inferred from a test
score." Id. Such questions typically focus on "what can be inferred about what is being
measured[,] and what can be inferred about other behavior." See George F. Madaus, Mini-
mum Competency Testing for Certification: The Evolution and Evaluation of Test Validity,
in GEORGE F. MADAUS, Tim COURTS, VALIDrrY, AND MINIMUM COMPETENCY TESTING
47-48 (1983) (analyzing minimum competency tests and their influence in this area).
169. See Roger W. Shuy, The Search for Content Validity through World Knowledge, in
GEORGE F. MADAUS, THE COURTS, VALIDITY, AND MINMUM COMPETENCY TESTING 209
(1983). Shuy adds that,
[t]he evaluation of any test must include an evaluation of the language content,
structure, and organization in the test questions and the instructions to discover
what help they give the test taker and to determine what the test taker needs to
know and do to answer the test questions adequately.
Id. at 211.
170. See APA STANDARDS, supra note 168, at 26-31 (describing the "independent
kinds of inferential interpretation" that "are traditionally described to summarize most test
use.").
The APA Standards actually identify four different categories of validity by dividing
criterion-related validity into two sub-categories: predictive validity (a measure of how well
the test items predict the future performance of test takers) and concurrent validity (how
well test results correlate with other criteria which might provide the same type of informa-
tion). See generally McClung, supra note 167, at 666-67 (discussing these four categories of
validity and introducing two additional types--"curricular and institutional validity").
However, legal analysis of test validity typically begins by recognizing the three general
categories of content-validity, construct-validity, and criterion-related validity. See, e.g.,
J'uly 1995]
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scores by admissions committees in a school choice context are likely
to focus primarily on either content validity or criterion-related valid-
ity. Content validity is most commonly evaluated for tests of skill or
knowledge, 171 while a criterion-related validation study can lead to an
analysis of cultural bias and/or an assessment of how well test scores
predict future performance.
C. Challenging a Test's Criterion-Related Validity under Title VI and
Title IX
Criterion-related validity is the category of validity most directly
applicable to the area of test-related admissions practices. While con-
tent validity is commonly evaluated for examinations at the end of a
learning sequence, 172 a criterion-related validity study often focuses
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 247 n.13 (identifying these as the "three basic methods of
validation").
171. See, e.g., Debra P. v. Thrlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 260 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (involving
the validity of a functional literacy exam as applied to high school graduation requirements
and determining that the test has adequate content validity).
172. In addition to the Title VI disparate impact cause of action described below, in-
jured plaintiffs may be able to challenge a test's content validity under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Most experts agree that a 'content valid' test will "sample the domain of knowledge"
by including representative and relevant content. Id. (quoting from the APA Standards).
In the analogous area of employment testing, a content valid test must measure or repli-
cate a "representative sample" of the job's duties. A test is not valid if it measures only a
small portion of those duties. See EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Pro-
cedure, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14C(4) (requiring that the "behavior(s) demonstrated in the selec-
tion procedure [be] a representative sample of the behavior(s) of the job). The content
validity of a teacher certification examination, for example, might be assessed by measuring
the degree to which the test content matches the content of teacher training programs. See
U.S. v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1112 (D.S.C. 1977) (burden of proving test's
content validity met by commissioning study which measured "the degree to which the
content of the tests match[ed] the content of the teaching program in South Carolina").
The content validity of a student minimum competency exam could be determined by ana-
lyzing the extent to which the test content represents the content of the curriculum. See
Shuy, supra note 169, at 216-17. Professor Shuy explains that content validity rests on five
important characteristics: accuracy, representativeness, importance, developmental rele-
vance and contextualization. Id. at 214-24.
A framework for challenging the content validity of testing programs on constitutional
grounds was identified by the former Fifth Circuit in Debra P. v. Thrlington, 644 F.2d 397
(5th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff students, objecting to new Florida minimum competency tests,
sought injunction relief under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses. Id. at 400-02.
After extensive testimony by prominent members of the measurement community, the
court came to the conclusion that a standardized test which lacked content validity would
be "fundamentally unfair" and thus violative of substantive due process. Id. at 404-05.
In granting relief to the plaintiff, the court stipulated that the injunction prohibiting
the administration of the test would be lifted if the State of Florida could establish that its
schools were actually teaching what was being tested. Id. at 408. In 1984, convinced that
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the test was now valid because the schools were teaching what was'being tested, the court
lifted the injunction. See Debra P. v. Turlington, 730 F.2d 1405, 1416-17 (11th Cir. 1984)
(Debra P. I).
Although the Florida litigation specifically addressed student minimum competency
testing, the court presented a wide-ranging analysis of fundamental fairness and the recog-
nized standards for determining the validity of all tests. Debra P., 644 F.2d at 405 n.10.
The method of analysis employed by the court of appeals in Debra P. is very similar to the
quasi-fundamental rights framework that emerged in many Fourteenth Amendment edu-
cation cases. See supra note 57. The court initially acknowledged that education was not a
fundamental right, but proceeded to cite a wide variety of school-related cases in support
of its determination that education was a "significant governmental responsibility." Debra
P. 11, 644 F.2d at 403. In a manner strikingly similar to Justice Brennan's approach in
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-24, Judge Fay reproduced key language from such major decisions
as Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Debra P., 644 F.2d at 403 (stressing the importance of public education and the entitlement
thereto as a property interest).
After establishing the relationship between test validity and substantive due process,
the court analyzed the expert testimony by employing heightened scrutiny. Under the
traditional rational basis standard, the state's actions would have been presumed valid and
"any conceivable basis" would have been sufficient to uphold the testing program. How-
ever, the Debra P. court refused to defer to the schools in this manner. Judge Fay con-
cluded "that the State may not deprive its high school seniors of the economic and
educational benefits of a high school diploma until it has demonstrated that the SSATII is a
fair test of that which is taught in its classrooms .... 644 F.2d at 408 (emphasis added).
The Fifth Circuit's "heightened scrutiny" framework may serve as a persuasive prece-
dent in support of an assertion that admissions testing within the context of a school choice
program would be violative of substantive due process if the test lacked content validity.
After establishing that "content validity... would be most important for a compe-
tency examination," the Fifth Circuit determined that "curricular validity," as an important
subset of content validity, could be the barometer for determining the constitutionality of
the present testing program. See id. at 405-06. Curricular validity was initially defined by
the Debra P. court as "things that are currently taught." 1d. at 405. However, in Debra P.
II, the district court adopted the term "curricular validity" in lieu of "instructional validity."
See 564 F. Supp. 177, 180 n.5 (1983) (finding defendants' test to be instructionally valid).
For a collection of scholarly papers devoted entirely to the subject of test validity and the
implications of the Debra P. ruling, see generally Madaus, supra note 168.
Plaintiffs challenging admissions testing under Debra P. must demonstrate that test
content did not match the relevant knowledge and skills. These Plaintiffs could argue that
the "test domain" represents neither the education that students are supposed to have
received before entering the new school nor the curriculum designed for the new admit-
tees. Since many admissions tests are fundamentally flawed in this manner, litigants would
have a very good chance of prevailing. The Educational Testing Service's Secondary
Schools Admissions Test (SSAT), for example, is currently required by many elite private
schools throughout the country before an applicant's file can be reviewed. Strikingly simi-
lar to the SAT, this multiple-choice test focuses on only a limited number of subject areas
and measures an even more limited number of skills. As an admissions test in a publicly
funded choice program, the SSAT would arguably need to be upgraded to include both
additional subjects and a much wider range of skills before it would be deemed "content
valid."
When responding to those who question their testing practices, schools, test makers,
and states have traditionally relied upon two key "boilerplate" arguments: (1) academic
decisions are appropriately left to the schools, and (2) we have "always" been doing things
July 1995]
on the predictive validity of a test at the application stage of a pro-
gram. 173 In the workplace, for example, criterion-related validity is
defined as the statistical relationship between scores on a test and the
objective measures of job performance. 174
Plaintiffs questioning the criterion-related validity of tests relied
on by admissions committees in a school choice program may chal-
lenge the predictive validity of these tests under either Title VI or
Title IX. Title VI litigants will argue that such testing discriminates
against students on the basis of race, color, or ethnicity, 75 while Title
IX litigants will seek to prove discrimination on the basis of gender.176
Courts hearing cases under either Title VI or Title IX have typi-
cally turned to the analogous and more highly developed jurispru-
dence of Title VII for guidance. 77 In the area of employment testing,
Title VI authorizes employers "to give and to act upon the results of
any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its ad-
ministration or action upon the results is not designed, intended, or
used to discriminate .... ,178
An extensive body of case law interpreting the relevant test-re-
lated provisions of Title VII has emerged over the past two decades.
Not only have these cases explicitly adopted the APA Standards and
this way. However, under the heightened scrutiny of a Debra P. analysis, the schools could
be required to articulate the rationales underlying their academic determinations. Profes-
sor Tribe explains that the courts apply the heightened scrutiny technique of "requiring
current articulation" when they refuse to supply a "challenged rule" with a rationale. See
TRIBE, supra note 54, at 1604. Such an approach represents a significant departure from
the traditional deference of the rational basis standard. Rather than exploring the limits of
"judicial imagination" to justify the challenged state action, the courts require defendants
to supply the rationale. See id.
Successful plaintiffs may thus require defendants to explain to courts and through the
courts to society as a whole, exactly why they are making decisions that significantly affect
students' lives based only on the limited content of a given test. The machine-scored, mul-
tiple-choice admissions test itself would no longer be "sacrosanct" and automatically ac-
ceptable as the standard vehicle for monitoring and certification simply because it has
"always" been. For a recent overview of alternative assessment approaches and new test-
ing technologies, see OTA REPoRW, supra note 162, at 18-16.
173. See supra, note 170 and accompanying text. It should be noted that predictive
validity is a subset of criterion-related validity.
174. See generally MAcK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 372-76
(1988) (overview of criterion-related validity).
175. See supra notes 121-157 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 78.
177. See generally supra, notes 76-80 and accompanying text. See also Sharif v. N.Y.
State Educ. Dept., 709 F. Supp. 345, 361-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (challenge to the award of
scholarships solely on the basis of SAT scores resolved by analogy to Title VII cases).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988) (emphasis added).
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their definitions of validity,179 but they have recognized two key prin-
ciples which litigants in a school setting will rely upon: (1) such tests
will satisfy the requirement of predictive validity only if the employer
(or educator) can show in a detailed and precise fashion that the test
"is actually predictive of performance at a specific job;' 80 and (2) a
validation study in this context should include an investigation of 'un-
fairness' or cultural bias in the test.'8 '
The Title VI framework set forth in Part II is equally applicable
here. To establish a prima facie case, litigants will attempt to demon-
strate that a particular practice disqualifies a disproportionate per-
centage of a protected class for the benefit at issue.182
In a lawsuit challenging the practice of testing applicants under a
choice program, parents and students must show that culturally biased
admissions tests disqualify a disproportionate number of minority stu-
dents from attending certain schools. These plaintiffs can rely on the
179. See eg., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 247 n.13 (arguing that hiring and pro-
motion practices with a disparate impact should be validated in terms of job performance
through APA standards). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431
(1975) (explaining that the EEOC Guidelines for employers determining whether their
employment tests are job related are drawn from the APA standards and entitled to great
deference). See generally Hamer v. Atlanta, 872 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Washington).
180. EEOC v. Atlas Paper, 868 F.2d 1487, 1498-99 (6th Cir. 1989). See also Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (stating that employment tests must be "a rea-
sonable measure of job performance" and that they "measure the person for the job and
not the person in the abstract").
See generally Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 633 F.2d 232, 241 (2d Cir.
1980) (citing Vulcan Society v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 360 F.Supp 1265, 1270 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973)) ("A job-related examination is one that accurately tests
the capacity of the applicant to do the job for which [she or] he is applying, or is 'reason-
ably constructed to measure what it purports to measure.'").
A showing of predictive validity in this context must be made by presenting a detailed
and precise statistical validation. The federal courts have shown great deference to the
EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §1607, which require
"formalized validation" according to APA standards. See, e.g., Atlas Paper, 868 F.2d at
1499-1500 n.18 (noting deference of past courts to EEOC regulations). Indeed, the Sixth
Circuit has cited with approval the EEOC regulations which "permit the use of studies
done elsewhere to validate tests at a different site[,] but only on specific findings of distinct
similarities in the work." Id. at 1500.
Merle McClung points out that an assessment of predictive validity "requires an analy-
sis comparing the predictions about each test taker based on the test results with the actual
functioning of the test taker at a later point in time. For example, if a high number of
students which an Adult Performance Level (APL) test had predicted would be function-
ally incompetent in fact turned out to be such when studied years later, then the test could
be said to have predictive validity." See McClung, supra note 167, at 666-67.
181. See generally PLAYER, supra note 174, at 375 (discussing treatment of cultural bias
in EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedure).
182. See supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
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Ninth Circuit's decision in Larry P. v. Riles in support of this
proposition. 183
Assuming that plaintiffs can demonstrate through an analysis of
statistical disparities that members of a protected class were dispro-
portionately excluded from certain schools,: 84 the central focus of the
litigation at this stage will become the admissions test itself-both the
particular practice and its impact.' 85 Although the courts have only
recognized the cultural bias of IQ tests, a large body of literature in
the education and measurement communities confirms that many
other types of standardized tests contain culturally biased test
items.'8 6 The Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT), for example, has
been widely criticized in this regard, and admissions tests are often
based on the SAT model.187
Defendants' chances of prevailing on this point depend on the
extent to which the test can be shown to have predictive validity de-
spite its cultural bias. Many believe that it is not possible to com-
pletely eliminate bias from standardized tests. 188 Schools and test
makers who can demonstrate that their test instruments still serve as
effective vehicles for predicting success at the next level may convince
the courts to rule in their favor despite demonstrated bias.
The above analysis is also available to plaintiffs under Title IX
and its applicable administrative regulations. Indeed, in Sharif v. N.Y.
State Education Department, 89 the federal district court employed the
same effects framework relied upon by the Ninth Circuit in Larry P.
to rule against the defendants. The Sharif plaintiffs sought an order
prohibiting the use of SAT scores alone to determine the winners of
the New York State Empire and Regents Scholarships.190 In a case of
183. 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984). See generally supra, notes 88-93 and accompanying
text.
184. See supra notes 66, 83, 102 and accompanying text.
185. See generally supra notes 130-141 and accompanying text.
186. See New Studies Question SAT Validity, FAIR TEST EXAMINER (Spring 1993).
187. See Jonathan Baron & M. Frank Norman, SAT's, Achievement Tests, and High
School Class Rank, as Predictors of College Performance, 52 EDUC. & PSYCHOL. MEASURE-
MENT 1047 (1992) (noting that Achievement Tests results correlated more consistently with
class rank than did SAT scores in a study at the University of Pennsylvania). See generally
JAMES CROUSE & DALE TRUSHEIM, THE CASE AGAINST THE SAT (1988) (discussing, inter
alia, the negative impact on black and lower-income college students).
188. See ROGERS ELLIOTr, LITIGATING INTELLIGENCE: IQ TESTS, SPECIAL EDUCA-
TION & SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE CLASSROOM (1987) (arguing that standardized tests are
inherently culturally biased and will result in lower scores for disadvantaged groups for
years to come).
189. 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
190. Id. at 348-56.
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first impression, the court found that the use of the SAT as the sole
criterion for awards was biased on the basis of gender and that the
district's practices violated Title IX.191
A similar argument can be advanced by litigants in a school
choice lawsuit. If a disproportionate number of female students were
denied access to certain schools because of a gender-biased standard-
ized test, plaintiffs could prevail by making the arguments outlined
above.192 Such contentions might be even more compelling under a
Title IX framework, since a large number of admissions tests today
are based upon the SAT model-a model that has already been called
into question by the courts in Sharif
If Title VI and Title IX plaintiffs succeed in establishing a prima
facie case, defendants will then seek to demonstrate the "educational
necessity" of their testing practices by showing that the testing of ap-
plicants at some point would have a "manifest relationship to the edu-
cation in question." 93 Schools are likely to contend that effective
admissions decisions must include testing, since standardized test
scores have a self-evident and unmistakable link to school perform-
ance. Such a contention might be strengthened if defendants take the
more defensible position that a test score will be only one of many
factors considered by the admissions committee and will not in and of
itself be determinative. 94
Even if necessity is proven, plaintiffs may still win by demonstrat-
ing the existence of equally effective, less discriminatory alterna-
tives.195 Plaintiffs should suggest that the school use a less-biased test
instrument, replacing the traditional multiple-choice test with a series
of authentic, performance-based assessments such as writing samples
and classroom-based hypothetical problems. Alternatively, plaintiffs
might argue that a certain number of admissions slots be set aside for
191. Md. at 364-65.
192. See supra notes 182-188 and accompanying text. See Sharif, 709 F. Supp. at 360-
62. The Sharif court recognized that the Title VII framework for disparate impact was
equally applicable in a Title IX context.
193. Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d at 982 n.9. See generally supra notes 142-154 (outlining
the requirements for demonstrating "necessity" in Title VI education cases).
194. Other factors that admissions committees may wish to consider include: space
availability, community service, performance during applicant interviews, letters of recom-
mendation, prior academic performance, and the appropriateness of the match between
the student and the particular school.
195. See generally supra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.
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students who simply do not perform well on standardized tests but
have demonstrated promise in other ways. 196
D. School Choice and Stratification
As a matter of policy, care must be taken to ensure that a new
school choice system does not become completely stratified. 197 A so-
lution might involve either reserving a certain number of places at
every school for students who have been unsuccessful in test situa-
tions, or basing admissions decisions on "merit" of another sort.198
Inappropriate classroom settings in a deregulated choice system
take a variety of forms. Some students will be forced to attend deteri-
orating institutions that have been abandoned by students with
stronger academic records who have gained admission elsewhere. 199
Such realities are actually envisioned by proponents of choice, who
expect that these schools will eventually "go out of business." Yet,
while they are going out of business, a process which may take years,
many young people will attend decaying schools staffed with unhappy
and often burnt-out teachers. These students will be grouped together
with a disproportionate number of fellow students who have also been
unsuccessful in their academic pursuits.200
196. Strictly regulated random admissions, with no standardized testing allowed, would
undoubtedly be the least discriminatory alternative. A key question at this point in the
litigation is whether such regulations satisfy the Title VI requirement that the alternative
practice also serve the institution's legitimate interests.
197. For examples of social stratification in the United States today, see David Spener,
Transitional Bilingual Education and the Socialization of Immigrants, 58 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 133, 134-43 (1988) (describing the role of "caste-like minorities" in the U.S. econ-
omy). See also Liebman, supra note 6, at 290 ([Q]uality competition ... [in a school choice
context] . . . is sure to stratify schools on the basis of student ability, if not family wealth").
198. A significant body of literature is available on the controversial subject of mer-
itocracy. See, e.g., MICHAEL DUNLOP YOUNG, THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY, 1870-
2033; AN ESSAY ON EDUCATION AND EQUALITY (1958) (arguing that meritocracy in Eng-
land has polarized society into an intelligent elite and an inferior lower class, and warning
of a future of populist uprising); Richard H. Fallon, To Each According to His Ability,
From None According to His Race: The Concept of Merit in the Law of Antidiscrimination,
60 B.U. L. REv. 815 (1980) (analyzing the concept of "merit" including its definition, its
"place in a complex system of social values" and its role in education and employment
law). See also George Judson, Lost in the Middle, N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 2, 1992, at 4A, 19
(arguing that society must stop ignoring the large group of children "in the middle"-
those who "drift through school without sending up the red flags that educators use to
recognize students in trouble").
199. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
200. Jonathan Kozol has documented the realities that exist in these urban educational
settings today. See generally KozoL, supra note 6.
In a particularly relevant section, the author describes the inequities that result from
the existence of several "selective high schools" in the New York City public school system.
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Inappropriate academic settings for students who fail to gain ad-
mission to the better schools include hastily formed private institu-
tions where inexperienced teachers and unqualified administrators
attempt to conduct educational programs in completely unsuitable
physical plants. Under programs envisioned by choice proponents, it
will be much easier to open such schools, and regulations preventing
these "ramshackle" operations will be significantly curtailed.201
The stigma of failure resulting from inappropriate educational
settings does not cease when the child leaves school.202 In Plyler v.
Doe, Justice Brennan described the consequences of this deprivation:
"[W]e foreclose," he explained, "the means by which [disfavored stu-
dents] might raise [the] level of esteem in which [they] are held by the
.majority. '20 3 Evidence of similar stigma-related deprivations proved
particularly damaging to the defendant's position in Brown v. Board
of Education.
The principal of one "nonselective" high school described the impact of such a structure on
her particular campus as having "'the effect of making Jackson a racially segregated high
school.., placing a disproportionate number' of nonachieving children in one school ...."
Moreover, Kozol explains, "students who do not meet 'acceptable standards' in their cho-
sen school are sent back to schools like Jackson, making it effectively a dumping ground for
children who are unsuccessful elsewhere." Id. at 107-08.
One commentator has recently addressed the question of whether school choice con-
stitutes resegregation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Analyzing the most current U.S.
Supreme Court decisions in this area, he concludes that this is not an effective approach for
prospective litigants to pursue. See Egle, supra note 25, at 487-99.
201. During the 1993 school voucher initiative campaign in California, commentators
focused on the potential problem of taxpayer money funding storefront schools of ques-
tionable quality. For example, Professor Ripston argued that
[t]he initiative would.. . allow any education huckster with 25 'students' to call
his or her business a school... [and] ... permit private schools receiving tax
money to operate without any accountability .... [It] ... is a bonanza for slick
operators peddling questionable or even quack educational gimmicks ....
[T]hese schools would be essentially unregulated, beyond the reach of even pub-
lic-health officials. Their buildings would not even be required to meet current
earthquake-safety standards.
Ripston, supra note 117 at B5.
The curriculum issue was also raised in this context, with critics documenting the pro-
spective inability of the state to prevent new or existing schools from teaching students
inappropriate or even immoral subject matter. See, e.g., Philipp M. Gollner, On the Cali-
fornia BalloL Should the State Help Pay for Private-School Pupils?, N.Y. TnMms, Aug. 4,
1993, at B9 (warning of potential "abuses like political or religious indoctrination of
children").
202. See e.g., Kim Ramsey, How Reform Perpetuates Social Tracking, 2 U.C.L.A. J.
EDuC. 115 (1987). See also David L. Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional and Pol-
icy Implications of Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 705, 731-37 (1973) (a classic
overview of the ways that schools stigmatize students).
203. 457 U.S. at 222.
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Litigants today can rely on even more advanced social science
research. David Spener, an education specialist at the Spanish Educa-
tion Development Center in Washington, D.C., has documented the
disenfranchisement of immigrants and other minorities "who [often]
score lower on measures of academic achievement.., because of cul-
tural and dialectical differences and decades of discrimination .... -204
Gary Orfield, in a recent study by the Harvard Project on School De-
segregation, found that the educational system increasingly perpetu-
ates "the educational inequality of minority students. '20 5 Finally, Joel
Handler, Chair of the National Panel on High-Risk Youth, concluded
in 1993 that "the problems of America's young people are getting sig-
nificantly worse .... This is a ... national tragedy that will have a
serious impact on all of us." '20 6
Although some forms of school choice are much more likely than
others to have a negative impact on the ability of many families to
access quality education, there are a variety of things that educators
and policy makers can do to protect the equal opportunity rights of
students in the areas of transportation and admissions. A relevant
statutory framework can help guarantee such protection, but day-to-
day educational questions can only be appropriately addressed if sen-
sitivity to equal access issues is a central feature of the decision-mak-
ing process.
Conclusion
Few educators today would argue that all school choice proposals
should be rejected out of hand. Too many successful programs have
already been introduced within the context of public school choice,
and a significant number of innovative plans linked to recent restruc-
turing efforts are now beginning to surface. Public education has been
204. See Spener, supra note 197, at 145 ("As evidence, . . . [critics] ... point to the
declining productivity of workers and the falling academic test scores of students. The
workers and students responsible for these declines are then seen as dragging down the
rest of the society as it strives to enter a new age of high-tech prosperity.").
205. The Harvard Project found that the number of African-American and Latino stu-
dents attending 'minority schools' is actually rising. See William Celis, III, Study Finds
Rising Concentration of Black and Hispanic Students, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1993, at Al.
See also Gary Orfield, Perspective on School Desegregation: America Lacks Equal Oppor-
tunity, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1993, at M5 (summarizing the report's contents).
206. See PANEL ON HIGH-RISK YouTH, LOSING GENERATIONS: ADOLESCENTS IN
HIGH-RISK SETrINGS vii (1993) [hereinafter LOSING GENERATIONS]. See also John I.
Goodlad & Jeannie Oakes, We Must Offer Equal Access to Knowledge, EDUC. LEADER-
SHIP, Feb. 1988, at 16, 22 (urging a renewal of education in the current societal period of
"malaise").
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enriched by alternative choice programs such as open schools, theme
schools, schools without walls, and schools within schools.207 Desegre-
gation efforts have been assisted by voluntary transfer plans for mi-
nority students and by proliferating magnet school programs.208 In
addition, recent school reforms with great potential for success have
included plans for high school graduation incentives, area learning
centers,209 charter schools, 210 and a wide range of open enrollment
options.211
A detailed examination of school choice from a legal perspective,
however, reveals that many of the largest and most wide-ranging plans
significantly infringe upon the equal educational opportunity rights of
students, with the deregulation inherent in these proposals creating
substantial barriers to equal access.
Litigants in this area can rely on a variety of emerging legal theo-
ries under federal law. Depending on the nature of the plan in ques-
tion and the particular circumstances impacting the injured plaintiffs,
lawsuits may be brought under both Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.212 Such
legal challenges might also be buttressed by a reliance on additional
relevant federal statutes and on local state constitutional provisions.213
207. WELLS, supra note 10, at 42-50.
208. See idU at 63-91 (discussing, inter alia, the role of freedom of choice plans and
magnet schools in desegregation efforts).
209. High school graduation incentives and area learning centers are two additional
choice options created by the Minnesota Legislature in the late 1980s. See; e.g., JOE NA-
THAN & WAYNE JENNINGS, CENTER FOR SCHOOL CHANGE AT THE HUBERT H.
HUMPHREY INsTTrUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, AccEss TO OPPORTUNITY: EXPERIENCES OF
MINNESOTA STUDENTS IN FOUR STATEWIDE SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS, 1989-90 (1990).
210. See generally supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., EDWARD B. FISKE, SMART SCHOOLS, SMART KIDS: Wi Do SOME
SCHOOLS WORK? 191-93 (1991) (discussing community reaction by educators and legisla-
tors to open enrollment systems). But see Isabel Wilkerson, Des Moines Acts to Halt White
Flight After State Allows Choice of Schools, N.Y. TIms, Dec. 16, 1992, at B9 (outlining
program in which white student's requests for transfers were denied).
212. Litigants challenging private school "voucher" plans are also likely to raise a vari-
ety of church-state issues under the first amendment. See, e.g., Wells & Biegel, supra note
14, at 220-25. An Establishment Clause analysis of school choice policy, however, is be-
yond the scope of this Article.
213. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. § 701-794 (1973), protect-
ing the rights of disabled persons in the public sector, is particularly relevant in this con-
text. See generally supra, notes 79, 90, 95.
Another federal statute, section 1703(f) of the Equal Educational Opportunity Act of
1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1988), guarantees language diverse students and English lan-
guage learners a basic floor of opportunity under federal law. The Act provides, in perti-
nent part, that "[n]o State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on
account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by (f) the failure by an educational
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These "legal pitfalls" can be avoided, however, by building neces-
sary protections into school choice policies and their implementing
legislation. As this Article has demonstrated, the areas of transporta-
tion and admissions must be addressed by any such statutory scheme.
Reasonable transportation costs for families below the poverty
line or living in distant locations should be a key feature of public
school choice programs, private school voucher plans, and charter
school legislation. Alternatively, depending on local residential pat-
terns, states can require that a certain minimum number of "schools of
choice" be distributed equitably and uniformly throughout designated
geographical areas.
The admissions process is perhaps the area with the greatest po-
tential for abuse in a deregulated environment, and both the policies
and practices of choice schools in this regard must be subject to strict
statutory guidelines. Admissions committees should be prohibited
from making decisions based solely on standardized test scores and/or
previous academic performance, although such numerical data may be
considered along with other relevant factors. Great care must be
taken to prevent stratification, and successful diversity program mod-
els in higher education should be emulated.
As a matter of policy, additional guidelines are available to archi-
tects of school choice programs in the education reform literature of
agency to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal partici-
pation by its students in its instructional program." The courts have determined that this
act does not require bilingual education per se. 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (f) (1988). See Castaneda
v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing bilingual education as one of two
ways for a school to format its EEOC requirements); Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified School
District, 724 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (upholding school district's alternative to bilin-
gual education). Plaintiffs in this context remain unencumbered by the Washington v. Da-
vis requirements, because a violation of section 1703(f) can be proven by demonstrating
the discriminatory effect of a school district's educational programs on minority students
who are disadvantaged because they do not speak English as their first language. See Stu-
art Biegel, The Parameters of the Bilingual Educational Debate in California Twenty Years
After Lau v. Nichols, 14 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 48 (1994) (explaining requirements
under section 1703(f)).
The potential for legal action in a school choice context under sections 504 and 1703(f)
are beyond the scope of this Article. However, for an analysis of how disabled students
might be affected by school choice, see Mei-lan E. Wong, Note, The Implications of School
Choice for Children with Disabilities, 103 YALE L.J. 827 (1993) (predicting that the imple-
mentation of a choice-based education system would lead to violations of the federal Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)).
For an overview of the potential applicability of state constitutional law in this area,
see supra note 113.
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the past ten years. 214 These years have been marked by the most ex-
tensive examination of schools in the history of this country. Studies
documenting both the successes and the failures of the U.S. educa-
tional system have proliferated, representing every possible educa-
tional perspective and every known political viewpoint.21 5 Significant
blueprints for education reform have been drafted 216 and choice is in-
creasingly seen as an integral part of this larger picture.2 17 A striking
consensus is evident on a number of very important fronts, with
214. Theodore R. Mitchell, Dean of the UCLA Graduate School of Education and
Information Studies, recently summarized the education reform literature of the past ten
years by identifying five basic themes that most would consider central to any restructuring
effort in a large urban setting: (1) decentralization, (2) "re-professionalization" of the
teaching profession, (3) establishment of linkages with the community, (4) a system of
accountability, and (5) a more equitable distribution of outcomes. Mitchell also discussed
four typical problem areas that have limited the success of many such efforts: (1) conflict
within existing power structures; (2) poorly organized decentralization efforts; (3) an in-
tensive focus on structure, with only a minimal focus on curriculum, and (4) failure to bring
local school-site educators and members of the community into the planning process. The-
odore R. Mifchell, An Overview of School Reform, Presentation to UCLA Teacher Cre-
dential Candidates (July 13, 1993) (on file with the author).
215. See JANE HANNAWAY & MARTIN CARNOy, DECENTRALIZATION AND SCHOOL IM-
PROVEMENT:. CAN WE FuuIu. THE PROUSE? (1993); Diane Ravitch, World-Class Stan-
dards: The Key to Excellence and Equity in Education, 4 STAN. L. & PoL'Y R v. 21 (1992-
93) (advocating the adoption of uniform federal standards as a method of reform); Chris-
tine E. Sleeter & Carl A. Grant, An Analysis of Multicultural Education in the United
States, 57 HARV. EDUC. REv. 421 (1987) (discussing the shortcomings of multicultural edu-
cation in the U.S.). See also Biegel, supra note 57, at 1101 n.171 (providing an overview of
the Education Reform Movement from 1983 to 1989).
216. See e.g., HENRY M. LEVIN, ACCELERATED SCHOOLS FOR AT-RISK STUDENTS
(1988); THEODORE R. SIZER, HoRACE's SCHOOL: REDESIGNING THE AMERICAN HIGH
SCHOOL (1992) (proposing a redesign of secondary school with a view toward preserving
educational traditions while preparing children for the future); James P. Comer, Educating
Poor Minority Children, Sci. AM., Nov. 1988, at 42-48 (urging the creation of a National
Academy of Education to oversee far-reaching educational reforms). See also ELMORE,
supra note 150 (studies of school restructuring, which the editor calls the "next generation
of educational reform"). See generally supra note 156 (additional examples of recent docu-
ments focusing on plans for improving education as a whole).
217. In School Choice, a report by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching, the Foundation
applauded the expansion of educational options among public schools. But our
support was conditional: It extended only to plans whose aims are to strengthen
public education generally, and to make excellent education accessible to every
child regardless of location or family income. We were especially impressed by
East Harlem, N.Y.; Montclair, NJ.; and Cambridge, Mass. Choice in these dis-
tricts has invigorated teachers and administrators, inspired a wide range of educa-
tional options, and, significantly, has secured a priceless base of satisfaction
among parents and students.
Mitgang, supra note 26, at 29.
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school choice policy experts generally agreeing on the following basic
principles for equitable and effective choice programs:
o Increased parental involvement should be an integral feature of
school governance at both the district level and the local school site
level. This involvement will help maximize the parents' "freedom to
choose" while creating community-based partnerships for successful
restructuring efforts. 218
o All required fees for extracurricular activities in deregulated
choice schools and any additional tuition costs in voucher redeeming
schools must either be prohibited or apportioned on a sliding scale
basis depending on ability to pay. Free public education must remain
the central feature of any choice system.
o Creative alternatives for students who wish to emphasize cer-
tain key areas of the curriculum can be an integral feature of a suc-
cessful choice program.2 19 Magnet schools, charter schools, and other
choice options are often designed to focus extensively on personal
spheres of interest such as science, athletics, or the performing arts.
These unique environments must be structured in such a manner that
ensures that they will remain open to all.
o "Controlled choice" plans that establish open enrollment within
certain designated areas should be encouraged. These plans would
ideally require all educational institutions in a targeted area to be-
come special schools by developing their own charters and missions.220
218. See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 6, at 307-13 (discussing ways to increase parental
voice in educational systems). See also LOSING GENERATIONS, supra note 206, at 193, 193-
234 (discussing successful "community-based interventions and services").
219. For example, a highly acclaimed choice program within East Harlem District 4 has
divided its four junior high schools into 23 alternative junior high settings-most designed
around curriculum themes and reflecting a particular style of pedagogy. See Deborah
Meier, In Education, Small Is Sensible, N.Y. Ti_.s, Sept. 8, 1989, at A25 (praising the
Harlem program for its focus on small schools). See generally SEYMOUR FLIEGEL, MIRA-
CLE IN EAST HARLEM: THE FIGHT FOR CHOICE IN PUBLIC EDUCATION (1993) (a start to
finish narrative of the District Four reforms).
220. For example, David Tyack explains that
[a]n alternate approach.., is a system of 'controlled choice' now being tried as a
desegregation strategy in cities like Cambridge, Massachusetts and Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. Essentially, this seeks to magnetize the whole system, to give all par-
ents a choice of schools while controlling for racial balance .... This approach
seeks to subvert 'geography as destiny' in the assignment of pupils.
David Tyack, Can We Build a System of Choice That Is Not Just a 'Sorting Machine' or a
Market-Based 'Free-for-All'? 9 EQUITY AND CHOICE 16 (1992).
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* Adequately staffed parent information centers must be estab-
lished to provide relevant background and supportive counseling serv-
ices for every family within a "choice area." 221
e Popular choice programs and theme schools should be repli-
cated to meet increased demand and address equity concerns.222 For
example, if a charter school focusing on Latin American Studies draws
a particularly large number of applicants, additional charter schools
with the same focus should be established.
• More power and autonomy should be granted to local educa-
tors so that they can tailor their educational programs to their own
individual communities.3
& Each student in a choice program should be guaranteed a school
choice. As Professor Amy Stuart Wells explains, "successful and equi-
table . . . choice plans do not foster a system of 'choosers and
nonchoosers' in which a lucky minority are admitted to the popular
and prestigious schools of choice while the rest are left behind in low-
status neighborhood schools." 24
The mid-1990s are an exciting time for educators. Innovative
models for the successful reform of America's schools have now been
drafted and many restructuring plans are already in place. School
choice is clearly an integral part of this landscape, but no one must
doubt the complexity of the tasks ahead.2 5
Ponderous and ill-conceived choice proposals that seek the pro-
verbial "quick fix" for America's schools by mandating substantial de-
regulation of the entire system will inevitably be met by principled
litigation to protect students' rights. Yet reasonable alternatives em-
bodying research-based strategies for effective school choice continue
221. See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 6, at 291 ("The open-enrollment experience of New
York City's high schools adds an equity objection-stratification on the basis of consumer
sophistication.").
222. See WELLS, supra note 10, at 93-95.
223. See e.g., Patricia Clifford & Sharon L. Friesen, A Curious Plan: Managing on the
7Tvelfth, 63 HARV. EDUC. Rnv. 339 (1993) (a case study of successful curriculum changes
designed and implemented by classroom teachers).
224. WELLS, supra note 10, at 92.
225. For example, Richard Elmore finds
[t]he task of reforming public education is much more complex than... [many]
... would believe. It involves, among other things, careful attention to the pro-
cess by which we educate and employ teachers, careful attention to diversity and
inequality among students and parents in their ability to influence markets and
public institutions, and careful attention to the ways in which schools affect stu-
dents by including or excluding them from serious academic instruction.
Richard F. Elmore, Politics, Markets & America's Schools, 10 J. PoL'Y ANALYSiS & MGMT.
687, 694 (1991) (book review).
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to gather momentum. Accompanied by appropriate statutory protec-
tions and linked to the policy reform efforts of the nation's best educa-
tors, it will be these quiet and thoughtful approaches that ultimately
make a difference in the lives of America's young people.
